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IV. Argument 
Holmes's opposition brief shows that the Court below could not properly have 
granted summary judgment because there were questions of fact. Further, Utah Code Ann. 
§57-1-12 establishes a lawful claim requirement not met here so that the lower court's 
decision is erroneous as a matter of law. 
A. MATTERS RAISED BELOW DENIED BY RESPONDENT. 
Holmes argues that the October 6th, 1997 transcript was omitted from the transcript 
order. That inadvertent omission has been corrected by Appellant. The additional 
transcript reveals that all of the matters which Mr. Maak claims were not raised below 
were argued in that hearing. Specifically, Mr. Spencer's limitation on title, Holmes's 
knowledge of potential defects in the title, the fact that this matter is not being brought by 
Holmes but by its title insurer who is bound by a contract of indemnification which limits 
Mr. Spencer's liability, were all raised in that hearing.l In addition, Holmes's brief 
overstates its case authority related to this issue. Although at page 25 of his brief he 
argues ''evidence not submitted to the Court prior to its ruling on summary judgment or 
properly rejected by the Court may not be considered on appeal." his cases do not support 
that. The primary authority, Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State 888 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 
1994) states that it is within a judge's discretion to accept or reject supplementary 
evidence. But that is not at issue here. The documents were argued to the court, shown to 
the court, and ultimately entered into the record. Holmes's second case, Territorial Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1989). holds merely that "evidence not 
available to the trial judge cannot be added to the record on appeal." The evidence was 
available and is in the record, it just was not considered. 
1
 10/6/99 Transcript 19:20 - 20:8. 
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Holmes asserts that the occupying claimant statute was not raised below. Paragraph 
40 et seq. of the Complaint specifically allege the elements of the occupying claimant 
statute as contained in Utah Code Annotated § 57-6-1, et seq. Allegations of holding under 
color of title, making of valuable improvements, disputed ownership, and the good faith (or 
lack thereof) of the owner are all in the complaint. The fact that plaintiffs omitted the 
statute number does not mean that the prima facie case was not plead. 
As to Holmes argument that the question of prohibited relief requested by Plaintiffs 
was not raised below, Holmes is mentioned in the Complaint only in paragraphs 46, 47, 48 
and 51. Those paragraphs are in the count seeking possession of the property. Mr. Spencer 
filed a Motion to Dismiss the entire Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). None of the cases 
which Holmes has cited have a requirement that a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim must explicitly identify every argument that might be urged. The 
fundamental nature of such a motion is that there is nothing in the Complaint to support 
any claim. Illegality is one such basis. Furthermore, the order granting summary judgment 
drafted by Holmes's counsel, finds that there was no basis for the Complaint as to 
Holmes. It is the law of the case, established by the summary judgment dismissing 
Holmes,2 that Plaintiffs had no factual or legal basis for bringing Holmes into this matter. 
Mr. Spencer's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was therefore well founded. 
B. ADMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT WHICH NEGATE IMPOSITION OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AGAINST MR. SPENCER. 
Holmes's brief makes the following admissions that establish that Mr. Spencer 
ought not be liable to the title insurance company for payment of his legal fees: 
Plaintiffs only claim against Holmes was for ownership of the property (page 4 
"nature of the case"). 
2
 Order granting summary judgment against plaintiffs, R. 681-690 
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The chain of title on the property is regular and proper (page 6, paragraph 1). 
On all issues in the case related to Holmes there was no factual dispute and Holmes 
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law ("issues" pages 6 and 7). 
The only issues as to Holmes were (1) whether Holmes had knowledge or notice of 
Plaintiffs1 claims against the property, (2) whether or not the transaction from Spencer-
Gamble Development to Spencer were unauthorized or otherwise challengeable, and (3) 
whether the Plaintiffs had possession of the property within seven years (pages 6 and 7). 
All of those issues were resolved, without dispute of fact, against the Plaintiffs. 
Holmes was a bona fide purchaser (page 7). There was an issue of fact before the 
Court as to whether or not Mr. Spencer offered to defend Holmes (page 9 footnote 3). 
There were no monetary claims against Holmes. 
The significance of those facts is as follows: 
1. Mr. Spencer Did Mount a Defense that Covered Holmes 
Spencer's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint should have been granted at the 
inception of the case, at the very least as to Holmes. All of the factors decided in the 
summary judgment dismissing the case as to Holmes existed at the moment the Complaint 
was filed. All of the rulings of the court; that the chain of title was regular, that there was 
no legal notice to Holmes, and that plaintiffs had not been seized of the property within 
seven years, were all present in the pleadings. Most, if not all, of those facts were actually 
determinable from Plaintiffs own Complaint. Therefore, when Mr. Spencer filed his 
Motion to Dismiss, that motion included all of the matters which ultimately got Holmes 
dismissed from the case. 
2. Mr. Spencer did not breach his warranty of title. 
The case cited by Holmes, Bloom v. Hendricks, 804 P.2d 1069, 1073-4 (NM 1991), 
states the warranty of title is merely that the seller has title that can be legally transferred 
and not defeated. The Court has determined the chain of title was regular and proper. It 
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found there were no factual issues in dispute as to plaintiffs" claims against Holmes. It 
found Holmes was not on notice, that the conveyances were authorized and 
unchallengeable. And it found there had been no possession by Plaintiffs within seven 
years. These findings demonstrate Mr. Spencer did have title to convey and did convey it 
and there was no legal or factual basis on which that title could be questioned. 
The cited case contains the following statements: 
The general effect of a warranty covenant is that the grantor agrees 
to compensate the grantee for any loss suffered by reason of the failure of 
title which the deed purports to convey. 6A R. Powell, The Law of Real 
Property para. 900[2][d] (1990).3 
The majority of these decisions recognize that, as a legitimate 
outcome of any failure of title, the grantee may recover his costs of 
defense, including reasonable attorney fees. These costs are held to be a 
proper element of damages. Id. at 162. 
Recovery of costs usually is not allowed, however, when a 
defense by the grantee is successful. See, e.g., Annotation, Liability of 
Grantor in Deed with Covenants, for Expense of Grantee's Successful 
Litigation with Third Party, 105 A.L.R. 729, 731 (1936); 7 G. Thompson, 
Commentaries on the Law of Real Property 3204 (1962); 20 Am. Jur. 2d 
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions 151 (1965); see also McDonald v. 
Delhi Saw Bank, 440 N.W.2d 839 (Iowa 1989); Double L. Properties, Inc. 
v. Crandall 51 Wash. App. 149, 751 P.2d 1208 (1988) (dictum): Booker T 
Washington Constr. & Design Co. v. Huntington Urban Renewal Auth., 383 
S.E.2d 41 (W. Va. 1989). Courts have reached this conclusion by 
interpreting the grantor's promise to defend against "lawful" claims as 
a promise to defend only against claims that in fact establish 
paramount title. Consequently, where the grantee has successfully 
defeated the adverse claim and no paramount title has been established, 
the grantor cannot be held to have breached either the covenant of title 
or his promise to defend.4 (Emphasis by holding added.) 
3 Id at 1073. 
4
 Id at 1074 
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Another case cited by Holmes also shows the duty to defend is much more 
restricted than is being argued by Holmes. Creason v. Peterson, 24 Utah 2d 305, 470 P.2d 
403, 404 (Utah 1970) states: 
The majority rule, with which we are in accord, is that there is a 
breach of warranty when it is shown that the grantor did not own the 
land that he purported to convey by the warranty deed description. .. 
The covenants involved are of seizin and of good right to convey the 
property, which for the purposes considered in this case, are 
synonymous; and the breach thereof is made out by a showing that 
those rights did not exist in the grantor, .. and it is not necessary to show 
an actual eviction or threat thereof. .. However, even though the grantee is 
entitled to the peaceable possession and enjoyment of the property he 
purchases in accordance with the warranties, ... he is entitled only to the 
damage he suffers as a result of the breach thereof, but this includes 
taking such measures as are reasonable and necessary to clear up any 
difficulty which would represent a substantial flaw in his title. (Emphasis 
added, footnotes omitted.) 
In this case it has been established as a matter of law5 that Mr. Spencer did have the 
right to convey the property and therefore the covenant has not been breached. 
Furthermore, as is discussed elsewhere herein, the cause of any loss suffered here is not the 
actions of Mr. Spencer, but the action of plaintiffs below who brought a spurious claim In 
that connection, Holmes pled for, but did not pursue, a judgment against plaintiffs for the 
fees that it now seeks from Mr Spencer. 
C. HOLMES ADMITS THAT THE LOWER COURT RESOLVED A 
QUESTION OF FACT AGAINST MR. SPENCER TO COME TO ARRIVE 
AT ITS DECISION HERE APPEALED. 
There were several disputed, material facts that weie resolved by the lower court 
against Mr Spencer in order to reach the result below. Those disputed material facts 
include: 1 Whether there was the offer of a defense by Mr. Spencer. 2. Whether the fees 
Order granting summary judgment against plaintiffs, R. 681-690 
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incurred were necessary. 3. Whether the fees incurred were reasonable. 4. Whether there 
was a reasonable opportunity was given to Mr. Spencer to undertake a defense. All of 
those factual questions were supported on Mr. Spencer's side by affidavits and admissible 
evidence.6 All were decided against Mr. Spencer. 
Mr. Spencer's affidavit, filed in opposition to Holmes's motion for summary 
judgment against him, states:7 
1. I am an adult, competent in all respects to testify before this court 
and have direct personal knowledge of all matters affirmed herein. 
2. When I was served with the complaint in this matter I contacted 
Mr. Robbie McKowan of Holmes and offered to defend Holmes. 
I received no response to that offer. I also directed my attorney, 
Mr. Willardson to take every action feasible to defend Holmes and 
obtain a prompt dismissal of the action as to Holmes. All documents 
filed on my behalf in this case were drafted with the idea of 
removing Holmes from the suit and defending their title to the 
property. I had numerous discussions on this subject with Mr. 
Willardson and in every instance where we had a practicable 
opportunity to attempt to defend Holmes or attempt to get them 
dismissed from the action, we took that action. Notwithstanding 
my willingness and efforts to defend Holmes, Holmes elected to 
procure their own attorney and elected to keep all 
communications related to their defense between themselves and 
Mr. Maak. It was solely because of Holmes unilateral action 
that less than all of Holmes' title defense was handled by me and 
counsel obtained by me. 
3. I paid for a title insurance policy in connection with a sale of the 
property to protect Holmes1 title. To my knowledge, Holmes has 
never contacted the insurer or made a claim on this matter. 
6
 In addition, Holmes asserts that it was appropriate to tax Mr. Spencer with Holmes's 
attorney fees because Mr. Spencer 'knew about the problem' before he passed title. 
Holmes's counsel specifically acknowledged to the lower court that such fact was 
disputed. 10/6/99 transcript p. 20, lines 17-21. 
7
 R. 761-763 
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4. I have, since Holmes' was dismissed from this case, contacted Mr. 
McKowan to suggest ways of helping Holmes' recoup any funds 
they expended in defense. That offer has, like my offer of assistance 
with defense of the action, been ignored. It is my belief, based upon 
those facts, that Holmes has not paid for any legal services in this 
regard. 
5. I believe that the fees being sought here are both unreasonable and 
unnecessary. Had Holmes accepted my offer to defend them they 
would not have been incurred at all and since Holmes' attorney 
has apparently expended almost twice what my attorney has, 
while defending a narrower set of issues, the amount of the fees 
seems excessive. 
6. We denied paragraph 7 of Holmes' cross-claim because Holmes 
ignored my offer and never provided either my attorney or I 
with any communication which would allow us to defend them 
beyond what was done. We did file motions to dismiss, 
undertook discovery, and did all other acts we could to remove 
Holmes from the suit, including joining in the motion for 
summary judgment which ultimately succeeded in 
accomplishing that end. 
7. Plaintiffs were not parties to the suit in which a lis pendens was once 
filed upon the property and were not named in any way therein. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Mr. Willardson's affidavit, which was also filed in opposition to the motion 
appealed here,8 states: 
1. I am an adult, competent in all respects to testify before this court 
and have direct personal knowledge of all matters affirmed herein. 
2. My client, Mr. Spencer, has consistently directed me to take 
every action feasible to defend Holmes and obtain a prompt 
dismissal of the action as to Holmes. I have followed that 
direction. All documents filed on my behalf in this case were 
drafted with the idea of removing Holmes from the suit and 
defending their title to the property. In every instance where we 
had a practicable opportunity to attempt to defend Holmes or attempt 
to get them dismissed from the action, we took that action. 
Notwithstanding, my efforts to defend Holmes, Holmes elected to 
8
 R. 779-781 
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procure their own attorney and elected to keep all communications 
related to their defense between themselves and Mr. Maak. It was 
solely because of Holmes unilateral action that less than all of 
Holmes' title defense was handled by me. 
3. I spent a maximum of 73.25 hours during 1997 and a maximum 
of 57.25 hours during 1998 and 1999 doing all of the same things 
as were done by Holmes' counsel in this action, as well as taking 
care of additional matters, such as the motions to dismiss that 
were prosecuted on behalf of Holmes, among others. The total 
hours expended amount to approximately 1/2 of the time for 
which Holmes is seeking reimbursement. 
4. I believe that the fees being sought here are both unreasonable 
and unnecessary. Had Holmes accepted Mr. Spencer's offer to 
defend them they would not have been incurred at all and since 
Holmes' attorney has apparently expended almost twice what I 
have, while defending a narrower set of issues, the amount of the 
fees seems excessive. 
5. I drafted the alternative denial of paragraph 7 of Holmes' cross-
claim because Holmes ignored Mr. Spencer's offer to defend and 
never provided either my client or I with any communication 
which would allow us to defend them beyond what was done. 
We did file motions to dismiss, undertook discovery, and did all 
other acts we could to remove Holmes from the suit, including 
joining in the motion for summary judgment which ultimately 
succeeded in accomplishing that end. 
6. Plaintiffs were not parties to the suit in which a lis pendens was once 
filed upon the property and were not named in any way therein. 
In spite of all that, the Court, in making its decision stated at page 26 lines 13-16 of 
the October 6, 1997 transcript, "and the court finds after a thorough reading of the record 
that there is simply no credible evidence that Spencer ever offered to defend Holmes." 
(Emphasis added.) It is well established that a court, in considering summary judgment, 
may not weigh or assess credibility of evidence. See, e.g., A.C. Financial, Inc. v. Salt Lake 
County, 948 P.2d 771, 785 (Utah 1997); Munford v. Lee Sennngs Company, 2000 UT App 
108, 999 P.2d 23 [f 15] (Utah App. 2000). Holmes's own case of Butterfield v. Okubo, 
831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992), shows how little is needed to establish a dispute of fact. In 
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Butteifield, the Utah Supreme Court held that an expert's affidavit created an issue of 
material fact defeating summary judgment. In that case, even though the affidavit failed to 
address a major weakness of plaintiff s case, it did deal with one possible factual scenario 
that would have allowed plaintiff to recover. That was enough to prevent summary 
judgment. 
Mr. Spencer, submitted an affidavit specifically alleging an offer to undertake 
defense and a rejection of that offer. That raised a material issue of fact. Summary 
judgment should not have been granted. 
Similarly, both the affidavits of Mr. Spencer and Mr. Willardson provide specific 
facts regarding the fees. The defense would have been undertaken by Mr. Spencer and Mr. 
Spencer's counsel did the same or similar work in one half as much time. There is 
therefore a disputed issue of material fact as to the necessity of the fees incurred. The 
lower court could not have granted summary judgment against Mr. Spencer without 
resolving that dispute against Mr. Spencer. 
For the same reasons, there was a dispute of material fact regarding whether the 
fees incurred were reasonable. Since a court may not award an unreasonable attorney fees, 
this was also improperly resolved against Mr. Spencer. The deliberate abandonment of 
Holmes's claim for attorney fees against plaintiffs, a fact that was before the court in 
awarding the summary judgment appealed here, also suggests the attorney fees were 
unreasonable or unnecessary.9 
The issue of subrogation was decided against Mr. Spencer without any factual basis 
at all. In a footnote of Holmes's reply brief, their counsel disclosed Holmes had not paid 
9
 The abandonment of the claim is shown as occurring in August 1999 R. 855-857: The 
argument of the summary judgment appealed here occurred 10/6/99 R. 982-983; The 
judgment was entered 2/3/00 R. 1359-1363. 
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any legal fees, but the fees had been paid by an un-named title insurance company.10 
Holmes's counsel asserted during oral argument the title insurance company was a 
subrogee. There was no evidence offered of the basis of the subrogation, and even the 
identity of the alleged subrogee, First American Title Insurance, was not disclosed until 
oral argument. In spite of that the lower court assumed, and decided solely upon that 
assumption, there was a factual and legal basis for subrogation, and Holmes was liable for 
the attorney's fees sought. 
Last, but not least, the affidavits, particularly that of Mr. Spencer, establish that Mr. 
Spencer asked to defend Holmes and Holmes ignored him and refused to provide 
information to allow such a defense to occur. In spite of that, Mr. Spencer did everything 
possible to support and defend Holmes. There is no case law anywhere that holds a grantor 
liable where the grantee prevents a defense by the grantor. The lower court resolved this 
also against Mr. Spencer. 
Each of those items requires reversal of the decision below. 
D. HOLMES MIS-STATEMENTS THAT TEND TO MISLEAD THE 
COURT. 
Holmes makes a number of assertions in its brief that are demonstrably false. At 
page 16 of its brief Holmes asserts that Mr. Spencer had issued "fraudulent deeds". 
However, there is a final judgment which has not been appealed which holds that the deeds 
were regular, proper, authorized, and not subject to challenge.11. 
10
 R. 862. Footnote 1. 
11
 Summary judgment dismissing Holmes, R. 681-690. 
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At page 22 Holmes's brief states that there is no document anywhere in the record 
regarding Mr. Spencer's offer to assist Holmes with their defense. In fact Mr. Spencer 
submitted an affidavit to that effect.12 
On page 29 Holmes's brief asserts that there are no examples of the duplicative 
work between Mr. Spencer and Holmes. In fact, the order granting summary judgment 
which dismissed Holmes from the case is entirely composed of bases included within the 
Rule 12(b) Motion to Dismiss filed at the very inception of the case by Spencer, which 
should have been granted. Starting with paragraph 11 of that judgment the Court made 
findings that are precisely in line with Mr. Spencer's argument in his reply memorandum 
in support of that motion. In addition, as was alleged in the hearing on October 6lh, 1997, 
counsel for Holmes and counsel for Mr. Spencer conferred orally at the inception of the 
case and throughout and Holmes's counsel declined to have Mr. Spencer's counsel assist. 
At page 7 Holmes asserts Mr. Spencer did nothing at all to help Holmes. The truth 
is to the contrary. Spencer's arguments regarding statute of limitations were adopted by 
the Court in dismissing Holmes from the case. In addition, Spencer did not oppose 
Holmes's motion and in fact joined in it. 
At page 19 Holmes asserts the issue of the property being sold "as is" was not 
raised until after the ruling. That is a misleading statement. The transcript of the October 
6th hearing shows the issue of the "as is" title was both raised and argued prior to the 
ruling.13 Mr. Spencer's counsel specifically referred to both the issues and the documents 
proving those issues in the argument that preceded the ruling.14 The transcript shows the 
12
 R. 761-763. 
13
 10/6/99 Transcript pp. 18:20-19:8. 
14
 This was discussed on 10/6/99 Transcript pp. 17-20. The documents were given to the 
judge at 10/6/99 Transcript pp. 17:11-17. 
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judge submitted his ruling without submission by Mr. Spencer's counsel.15 The only 
things related to these issues that occurred after the ruling were the request that the 
documents be admitted into the record16 and their subsequent admission to the record on 
the motion for reconsideration.17 
Another misleading inference appears on page 8 that an amount of $50,000.00 was 
paid to Josephson. The cited support is two pages of transcript testimony from Mr. 
Spencer where an escrow of $50,000.00 is referenced. Holmes's support for that statement 
is Mr. Spencer's deposition, pages 181 and 182. On page 184 of that same deposition Mr. 
Spencer testified that only $16,000.00 was ultimately paid to Mr. Josephson. While page 
184 did not make it into the record Holmes used to support its motion for summary 
judgment, it is clearly in Holmes's possession. 
Holmes has also mislead the court as to the effect of the ruling it seeks to avoid. 
Holmes has argued that reversing the decision below will "force those innocent parties to 
bear the cost of defending against those claims." 18 That is far from the truth. When it 
filed its answer, Holmes also filed a counterclaim against plaintiffs, seeking its "costs, 
expenses, and attorney's fees."19 In drafting its summary judgment order, Holmes included 
15
 10/6/99 Transcript pp. 25: 18-20 shows that the lower court judge asked the parties if 
they submitted, and then began announcing his decision as soon as Holmes's counsel 
stated that it was submitted. 
16
 10/6/99 Transcript pp. 28:20-21:3. 
17
 R. 1204-1206, especially page 1205, f 9 (including all subparts); 1214-1221, especially 
pages 1217^9. 
18
 Holmes's brief, page 13, lines 6 & 7. 
19
 R. 121. 
16 
its costs in the order, but omitted to apply for its attorney fees.20 The judge below had 
determined that plaintiffs claim as to Holmes was wholly without merit. In spite of that, 
Holmes elected not to ask for attorney fees against the very persons who directly caused 
the attorney fees to be incurred. Holmes went further by voluntarily stipulating to 
dismissal of the counterclaim against plaintiffs.21 . There is no case law cited that allows 
the grantee to refuse to collect its fees from the maker of a spurious claim merely so that 
the grantoi can be disadvantaged. There is nothing, other than Holmes's own election, 
which prevents Holmes from collecting its costs and fees from the plaintiffs who brought 
the unlawful claim. Reversing the decision below will not disadvantage an "innocent" 
grantee. Rather, it will prevent a grantee who was on notice that prior claims had been 
made, and bought property "as is" anyway, from colluding with the people who attacked 
the grantee's title and disadvantage the grantor. 
As was argued at pages 13, 14, 15, et seq. of the October 6 hearing, one of the 
prima facie elements to recovery of fees in this situation is that the fees have been paid. It 
came out at the hearing, for the first time, that the nominal Holmes here is not the real 
party in interest. The real party is First American Title.22 That fact was concealed until the 
argument on the motion appealed here. Since Holmes apparently did not pay any fees 
(they did not furnish an affidavit that they had and their reply brief says the fees were paid 
by a title insurance company), we are dealing with an alleged subrogee's claim. Fees can 
only be properly awarded to First American Title if there is either a legal or equitable basis 
for subrogation. That was not even alleged by Holmes's counsel. The lower court had 
neither a factual or legal basis to rule on such a claim. 
20
 R. 687 
21
 R. 855-857. 
22
 10/6/99 Transcript pp. 13:14-25. 
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Far from punishing an "innocent" grantee, reversing the decision below will 
promote fairness and justice by putting primary liability for bringing factually and legally 
unjustified claims upon the parties who bring those claims. It will have the further 
beneficial effect of preventing title insurance companies from concealing true interests 
from the courts. 
E. HOLMES IS RELYING UPON CONFUSION OF ISSUES AND TIMING 
TO MISLEAD THIS COURT. 
Holmes's brief makes several citations to the ongoing case between Mr. Spencer 
and the Plaintiffs. Holmes fails to point out that case has not reached a final conclusion, 
and there is no judgment entered. While the trial has concluded, and Judge Lewis has 
announced the result that she intends to reach, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
have not been prepared, or entered. Judge Lewis may still amend her decision at any time 
up to through entry of a judgment. Such a judgment, if entered, would be subject to appeal 
and potential reversal. In fact, Judge Lewis indicated toward the end of her 
pronouncements that her opinion of Mr. Spencer was ameliorating and that she believed 
that whatever liability he had toward the Plaintiffs in the case not subject to punitive 
damages, and not typical of his behavior in business (and therefore, by inference, not 
willful).23 
Another way in which Holmes is confusing the issues is their citation of the 
ongoing lower court case as a basis for asserting the claim against Holmes was a lawful 
claim. As is discussed above, the lower court has already found the claim for possession of 
the property was not a lawful claim. The Court has also found the claim for title to the 
property was not a lawful claim, being barred by the statute of limitations. 
23
 August 24, 2000 transcript (record page 1519) pp. 88:8-20. 
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The rules regarding statute of limitations require them to be plead with 
particularity. Mr. Spencer's answer did so.24 Mr. Spencer sought to have the case 
dismissed on that basis.25 Holmes did not file an answer until approximately a week after 
Mr. Spencer filed his motion to dismiss.26 The summary judgment in favor of Holmes 
against Plaintiffs specifically relies upon the statute of limitations. 
Another bit of mis-direction by Holmes is the assertion that Judge Lewis' statement 
that she was ruling in favor of Plaintiffs against Mr. Spencer on "all counts" put Holmes' 
title in jeopardy. Since the quiet title count had previously been resolved in favor of 
Spencer and Holmes the only possible meaning is Judge Lewis was resolving the 
remaining counts (which applied only to Spencer) against Mr. Spencer. 
F. THERE IS NOTHING IN THIS CASE THAT CAN TURN A CLAIM 
WITHOUT BASIS IN FACT OR LAW INTO A "LAWFUL" CLAIM. 
The appellate courts of Utah have not previously decided a case specifically 
addressing the question of how the "lawful claim" language of Utah Code Ann. §57-1-12 
limits the liability of grantors under warranty deeds. The majority of jurisdictions with 
such limiting language hold that a claim against title that fails, such as the one here, is not a 
"lawful claim." Therefore there is no duty on the part of the grantor to defend. This Court 
should clarify the meaning of the statute. 
The cases cited by Holmes do not provide strong support for Holmes's position and 
certainly do not compel this Court to adopt a legal interpretation that makes the statutory 
limitation meaningless, as is urged by Holmes. 
24
 R. 92-93. 
^ R. 89-91, 105-107 
26
 R. 89 shows the motion to dismissed was filed 9/9/97'; R. 108 shows Holmes' answer 
was filed 9/15/97 
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All of Holmes's cases holding the giantoi liable do so only where the grantoi had 
done something directly affecting the title giving rise to the suit That principle is 
fundamentally different fiom the present case While Mi Spencei may or ma) not have 
done something to render him liable for money damages to the Plaintiffs, it is conclusively 
established heie27 the title was both regulai and pioper and pioperly conveyed It is further 
conclusively established Plaintiffs are barred as a mattei of law from claiming title to the 
piopeity 
To adopt Holmes's aigument is to make the "lawful claim" language of the statute 
completely meaningless Every lawsuit bi ought involves at least some allegations of 
misconduct by the defendants Therefore, if Holmes's logic weie adopted, eveiy suit 
which sought title, no mattei how tangential, unjustified, 01 spunous, would lequne a 
grantoi to defend That cannot have been the legislative intent These woids must mean 
something 
It is conclusively established m this case Plaintiffs claim was without basis m fact 
01 law If the "lawful claim" language of the statute means anything at all, it must mean 
that a claim against title which is without basis m both fact and law is not included in the 
wananty 
V. CONCLUSION 
Both sides are m agieement that the appiopnate standard of review for this mattei 
is correctness Reversal is compelled both because the statute, Utah Code Annotated § 57-
1-12 excludes unlawful claims such as the instant mattei, and because theie aie issues of 
material fact which prevent summary judgment 
27
 Summary judgment dismissing Holmes R 681-690 
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Mr. Spencer therefore respectfully requests this Court vacate the lower court 
decision and enter a decision finding Mr. Spencer not liable for attorney's fees as a matter 
of law. 
Dated: Wednesday, May 9, 2001 
Attorney Tor Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I Heieby Certify that I caused to be delivered as specified below on the date 
specified below, two true and correct copies of the foregoing "Repl> Bnef of Appellant" to 
the following 
BiuceA Maak 
Pan, Waddoups, Biown, Gee & Loveless 
185 S State Street, Suite 1300 
P O Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
Sent via 
z A Mail 
Facsimile 
Hand-delivery 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
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PAUL BYINGTON, an individual, JAMES 
WEBSTER, an individual, and SUMMIT 
CONDO 4, a Utah Partnership 
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THOMAS L. SPENCER, an individual, 
[APPELLANT] GEORGE T. GAMBLE, an 
individual, SPENCER-GAMBLE 
DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP, a Utah 
partnership, and JOHN HOLMES 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Utah Corporation 
[HOLMES] 
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Appellate No. 20000508 CA 
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Addendum to Reply Brief of Appellant 
Denver C. Snuffer #3032 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen P.C. 
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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
Bruce A. Maak 
Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless 
185 S State Street, Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
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ATTORNEY FOR HOLMES 
Denver C. Snuffer # 3032 - ^
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NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE ~^~~ 
Attorney for Defendants Spencer-Gamble Development Partnership and Thomas L* Spencer 
10S85 South State Street * 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone (801) 576-1400 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE O? UTAH 
PAUL BYINGTON, an individual, JAMS 
WEBSTER, an individual, and SUMMIT 
CONDO 4, a Utah Partnership 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THOMAS L. SPENCER, an individual 
GEORGE T. GAMBLE, an. individual, 
SPENCER-GAMBLE DEVELOPMENT 
PARTNERSHIP, a Utah partnership, and 
JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION, IN 
Utah Corporation 
Defendants. 
Comes now defendants Spencer-Gamble .Development Partnership and Thomas L. Spencer 
("defendant" or "defendants") by and through the undersigned counsel of record and answer 
plaintiffs complaint as follows: 
Flr&t Affirmative Defense -•-.Pallurgi^ 
1 * Plaintiffs complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. 
Among other defects, the complaint and attachments show that one of the plaintiffs, the putative 
joint venture, ceased to exist thirteen or more years before this action was filed, if it ever existed. 
There is no privity between any of the plaintiffs and any of the defendants other than Mr. Gamble* 
Plaintiff Byington is, by the documents incorporated v/ithin the compliant, a stranger to the 
transaction. Plaintiff Webster is not alleged to have had any activity of any kind, between the time 
of the alleged joint venture formation and the filing of this action. 
Civil No. 960908672 CV 
Judge: 
00077 
Second Affjrfrrtat^'? Qg*q*iftfl - rJr^'',\-3^Jl..^_A^°n^ 
2. Plaintiffs complaint i<. barred by Utah Cede Annotated §? 7M2-5, 7M2-6, snd 78-12-7 
pertaining to real property and §§ 78-12-27, and 7S-12-25 **> to other claims. 
Third Affirmative Dft*ftnpe - > c > ^ y 
3. Plaintiffs complaint is barred by the doctrine of Inches. 
Fourth Jkfflrrnaflvg Q&1%r*$e* - /^fliifflefo^y ff P^Qj^ss 
4. Plaintiff has not caused defendant Tnomas 1. Spenre- to be personally served ir^  this 
action* The summons and complaint sensed is addressed to "Spencer-Gamble Development 
Partnership/ rather than to Vs. Spencer individually. 
gi1fth Affirmative Defense - fofty^cfortsy ^j3^y^^.^p^.f^}335. 
5. Plaintiff has not caused iefendant Thomas L. Spencer to be personalJy served In this 
action. The summons mi6 complaint served is addressed to "Spencer-Gamble Development 
Partnership," rather than to Mr. Spencer individually. 
Sixth Affirmative .Defend - Failure ol ConsfciarpfioTE 
6. Plaintiff has not provided consideration for the benefits claimed in plaintiffs' complaint. 
Seventh A^lrmgl'v^ Deforce - ?^f±tf:^^.3l^ 
7. The complaint alleges plaintiffs are entided to ^ ecove^ tinde*- a putative joint venture. 
Defendants contend that no such join: venture was ever formed and therefore genera1 ly deny 
plaintiffs claims. 
00078 
Bruce A. Maak, Of Counsel (2033) 
PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN, GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendant John Holmes Construction, Inc. 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: 801-532-7840 
Fax: 801-532-7750 
STATE OF UTAH 
/5.7; 
m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
PAUL BYINGTON, an individual, JAMES 
WEBSTER, an individual, and SUMMIT 
CONDO 4, a Utah partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THOMAS L. SPENCER, an individual; 
GEORGE T. GAMBLE, an individual; 
SPENCER-GAMBLE DEVELOPMENT 
PARTNERSHIP, a Utah partnership; and 
JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 970300098 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of defendant John Holmes Construction, Inc. 
came on regularly for hearing before the Court, the Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding, on 
October 7, 1998 at 3:00 p.m., plaintiffs Paul Bymgton, James Webster and Summit Condo 4 
appearing through their counsel, Mark C. Quinn, Esq. and defendant John Holmes 
Construction, Inc. appearing through its counsel Bruce A. Maak, and the Court having 
reviewed the memoranda and evidentiary materials submitted by the parties, having heard the 
arguments of counsel, being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing 
therefore, hereby makes and enters the following Determinations and Order: 
Determinations 
1. There exist no genuine issues of material fact with respect to the 
determinations set forth below. 
2. John Homes Construction, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Holmes") 
purchased from Thomas L. Spencer a tract of land located in Summit County, State of Utah, 
more particularly described on Exhibit "A" hereto (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"). 
Holmes paid Spencer the sum of $236,111.00 for the Property. Plaintiffs's counsel conceded 
that the Court should assume that Holmes paid fair market value for the Property. 
3. At the time of Holmes's purchase of the Property, a Lis Pendens previously 
recorded by William Josephson (the "Josephson Lis Pendens") had been released. Holmes in 
any event never saw the Josephson Lis Pendens. The Josephson Lis Pendens, itself, did not 
disclose the claims of plaintiffs with respect to the Property or any assertion that prior 
transfers of the Property were unauthorized. The Josephson Lis Pendens did not give 
Holmes constructive notice of the claims of plaintiffs in this action. 
. 0 . oo 
4. At the time of Holmes's purchase of the Property, and the recordation of the 
Warranty Deed from Thomas Spencer to Holmes, Holmes did not have knowledge or notice 
of the claims of plaintiff with respect to the Property. 
5. Plaintiffs recorded their Lis Pendens substantially after Holmes purchased the 
Property. At the time Holmes purchased the Property, there was nothing in the public 
record that gave Holmes constructive notice of plaintiffs's claims or of any deficiencies of 
prior transfers of the Property. 
6. Meridian Title and James Ivins advised Holmes that there were no clouds on 
Holmes's title and Holmes could prudently close the Property. Holmes was entitled to rely 
on Meridian Title and James Ivins and was not obligated to make further inquiry or 
investigation. 
7. Plaintiffs argue that Holmes was on notice of plaintiffs's claims in this action 
at the time of its purchase because a copy of the Complaint filed by William Josephson was 
in the files of Meridian Title, the title company that assisted Holmes with the closing of its 
purchase. That argument is rejected for the following reasons: 
(a) Plaintiffs submitted no evidence that the Josephson Complaint .at the 
time of the Holmes's purchase was in the files of Meridian Title or known to 
Meridian Title. 
(b) The Meridian Title representative with whom Holmes dealt, James 
Ivins, did not have knowledge of the Josephson Complaint at the time Holmes 
purchased the Property. 
-3- 00683 
(c) Neither Meridian Title nor James Ivins advised Holmes of the 
Josephson Complaint, its content, or plaintiffs's claims prior to Holmes's purchase. 
(d) Neither Meridian Title nor James Ivins had such a relationship with 
Holmes as would result in the knowledge of Meridian Title or James Ivins being 
constructively imputed to Holmes. 
8. Whether or not the conveyance of the Property from Summit Condo IV to 
Spencer-Gamble Development and the conveyance from Spencer-Gamble Development to 
Thomas L. Spencer were unauthorized, beyond the scope of the authority of the signatories 
of those conveyances, or otherwise subject to challenge by Summit Condo VI, Byington, 
Webster, or any other partner in Summit Condo VI, those conveyances are effective with 
respect to Holmes's ownership of the Property and are not subject to challenge by plaintiffs 
with respect to the interest of Holmes in the Property because, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§48-1-7, Holmes acquired the Property from Thomas Spencer for value without knowledge 
that the partners executing such prior transfers in making the conveyances exceeded their 
authority. 
9. Holmes did not at the time of its purchase have actual knowledge of any defect 
or deficiency in the authority of the partners to execute such prior conveyances and did not 
have knowledge of any other facts that, to act in disregard of them, shows bad faith within 
the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §48-1-2(1). 
10. Holmes purchased the Property for valuable consideration and recorded its 
Deed prior to plaintiffs's recordation of their Lis Pendens without actual constructive notice 
or knowledge of the claims of Byington and Webster. Therefore, the claims of plaintiffs 
Byington, Webster and Summit Condo VI are void as against the claim of Holmes under the 
Recording Act, Utah Code Ann. §57-3-3. 
11. The applicable limitations provision is Utah Code Ann. §78-12-5, which 
requires that plaintiffs be seized or possessed of the Property within seven years before the 
commencement of this action. 
12. Plaintiff Webster was not on the Property more than approximately four times 
during the past fourteen years and plaintiff Byington was not on the Property more than two 
times in the past sixteen years. Summit Condo VI did not hold record title to the Property 
for in excess of fifteen years before this action was commenced. There is no evidence that 
any party physically occupied the Property for or on behalf of plaintiffs within seven years 
prior to the commencement of this action. 
13. Plaintiffs argue that Thomas Spencer and/or others engaged in fraudulent 
concealment which tolled the running of the statute of limitations against Holmes. The Court 
rejects this argument for the following reasons: 
(a) Holmes, itself, did not engage in, participate in, approve, or have 
knowledge of the alleged fraudulent activities. 
(b) The alleged fraudulent activities were complete two and one-half years 
before Holmes had any contact with or involvement with the Property. 
(c) Assuming that Thomas Spencer did engage in the fraudulent conduct of 
which plaintiffs complain, Spencer so acted for his own account and not on behalf of, 
n P P o •"* U L O b J 
for the purpose of, with the knowledge of, or at the behest of, or for the benefit of 
Holmes. 
(d) The relationship between Holmes and Spencer was limited to, that of 
buyer-seller. That relationship is, as a matter of law, insufficient to allow the conduct 
of Spencer to toll the limitations period with respect to claims against Holmes. 
(e) Plaintiffs's claims against Holmes are barred by the statute of 
limitations, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-5. " 
Order 
Based upon the foregoing Determinations, it is hereby Ordered, Adjudged, and 
Decreed as follows: 
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment of Holmes dated June 29, 1998 be and the 
same is hereby granted. 
2. Plaintiffs's Complaint against Holmes be and the same is hereby dismissed 
with prejudice and upon its merits. 
3. Neither Paul Byington, James Webster, nor Summit Condo VI have any right, 
title, claim, or interest in any tract of land located in Summit County, State of Utah more 
particularly described on Exhibit "A" hereto. 
4. The Lis Pendens recorded in the Summit County Recorder's office by 
plaintiffs with respect to the claims asserted by them in this action on July 18, 1997 as Entry 
No. 482932 in Book 1061 at Pages 249-250 be and the same is hereby released and 
discharged from the record. 
"
6
" OCGS o 
Holmes shall recover his costs in this action m the amount of 
from plaintiffs Byington, Webster and Summit Condo VI jointly and 
severally. 
MADE AND ENTERED by the Court t h i s t ^ 2 daY o f /f^'r*^*/!'>"*. 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
,>7 
Approved as to form: 
Mark C. Quinn, Esc 
O'RORKE & GARDINER 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
<L <>^C 
Pat B. Brian 
District Judge 
[aak, Of Counsel 
, WADDOUPS, BROWN, 
GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendant John Holmes 
Construction, Inc. 
^ O i 
£»* "V> •*"* 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY, CERTIFY that the foregoing Order Granting Summary Judgment was 
served this / 3 Y ^ay of October, 1998, by mailing on said date copies thereof by United 
States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Patricia A. O'Rorke, Esq. 
Mark C. Quinn, Esq. 
O'Rorke & Gardiner 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
6995 Union Park Center, Suite 470 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Frederick A. Jackman, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant George T. Gamble 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 110 
Orem, Utah 84097 
Timothy M. Willardson, Esq. 
Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle 
Attorneys for Defendants Thomas L. Spencer and 
Spencer-Gamble Development Partnership 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Kris Henriod, Secretary 
OC 683 
E X H I B I T A 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
The land referred to is situated m Summit, and is described as follows-
BEGINNING AT A POINT WHICH IS NORTH 89 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 54 SECONDS 
EAST 2781.38 FEET ALONG THE SECTION LINE FROM THE SOUTHWEST COPNER OF 
SECTION 30, TOWNSHIP 1 SOUTH, RANGE 4 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN; 
AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 239.84 FEET TO A POINT ON A 180.00 FOOT RADIUS 
CURVE TO THE LEFT (RADIUS POINT BEARS NORTH 1 DEGREES 11 MINUTES 44 
SECONDS WEST); AND RUNNING ALONG SAID CURVE 86.30 FEET TO A POINT ON A 
330.00 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT (RADIUS POINT BEARS SOUTH 28 
DEGREES 39 MINUTES 55 SECONDS EAST); AND RUNNING ALONG SAID CURVE 165.10 
FEET; THENCE EAST 179 08 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 132.4 1 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 23 
DEGREES 54 MINUTES 56 SECONDS EAST 49 33 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 119.17 FEET 
TO THE SECTION LINE; THENCE SOUTH 89 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 54 SECONDS WEST 
440.00 FEET ALONG SAID LINE TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING 
LESS THAT PORTION THAT LIES WITHIN QUAIL MEADOW TOWNHOUSE, PHASE 1. 
LESS THAT PORTION THAT LIES WITHIN QUAIL MEADOW TOWNHOUSE, PHASE 2. 
LESS; BEGINNING AT A POINT WHICH IS NORTH 89 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 54 
SECONDS EAST 3 04 5.18 FEET ALONG THE SECTION LINE AND NORTH 172.07 FEET 
FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SECTION 30, TOWNSHIP 1 SOUTH, RANGE 4 EAST, 
SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, SAID POINT ALSO BEING ON A 921.00 FOOT 
RADIUS CURVE TO THE LEFT (RADIUS POINT BEARS SOUTH 2 DEGREES 4 9 MINUTES 
56 SECONDS EAST); AND RUNNING THENCE ALONG SAID CURVE 111.20 FEET; 
THENCE SOUTH 80 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 00 SECONDS WEST 74.84 FEET TO A POINT 
ON A 39.00 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT (RADIUS POINT BEARS NOPTH 9 
DEGREES 45 MINUTES 00 SECONDS WEST); AND RUNNING ALONG SAID CURVE 67 90 
FEET; THENCE NORTH 54.78 FEET TO A POINT ON THE SOUTHERLY RIGHT OF WAY 
LINE OF MEADOW LOOP ROAD, SAID POINT ALSO BEING ON A 180.00 FOOT RADIUS 
CURVE TO THE LEFT (RADIUS POINT BEARS NORTH 12 DEGREES 06 MINUTES 04 
SECONDS WEST; AND RUNNING ALONG SAID CURVE 52.04 FEET TO A POINT ON A 
330.00 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT (RADIUS POINT BEARS SOUTH 28 
DEGREES 39 MINUTES 55 SECONDS EAST); AND RUNNING ALONG SAID CURVE 64 93 
FEET; THENCE SOUTH 62 DEGREES 00 MINUTES 54 SECONDS EAST 96.26 FEET; 
THENCE SOUTH 28 DEGREES 45 MINUTES 15 SECONDS EAST 75.98 FEET TO THE 
POINT OF BEGINNING. 
LESS; BEGINNING AT A POINT WHICH IS NORTH 89 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 54 
SECONDS EAST 3 085.38 FEET ALONG THE SECTION LINE FROM THE SOUTHWEST 
CORNER OF SECTION 30, TOWNSHIP 1 SOUTH, RANGE 4 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND 
MERIDIAN; AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 6 DEGREES 3 0 MINUTES 5 4 SECONDS WEST 
125.00 FEET; THENCE NORTH 28 DEGREES 45 MINUTES 15 SECONDS WEST 7 05 
FEET TO A POINT ON A 879.00 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT (RADIUS POINT 
BEARS SOUTH 1 DEGREES 29 MINUTES 38 SECONDS EAST); AND RUNNING ALONG 
SAID CURVE 154.05 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 119.17 FEET TO THE SECTION LINE, 
THENCE SOUTH 89 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 54 SECONDS WEST 13 6.00 FEET ALONG 
SAID SECTION LINE TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
O D 4 6 2 S O S BK00793 PGQOCHO 
ORDER NO. 22401 
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Timothy Misuel Willardson # 4443 
Denver C. Snuffer #3032 
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE 
Attorneys for Tom Spencer 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone (801) 576-1400 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
PAUL BYINGTON, an individual, JAMES 
WEBSTER, an individual, and SUMMIT 
CONDO 4, a Utah Partnership 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THOMAS L. SPENCER, an individual, 
GEORGE T. GAMBLE, an individual, 
SPENCER-GAMBLE DEVELOPMENT 
PARTNERSHIP, a Utah partnership, and 
JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION, INC., a 
Utah Corporation 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS L. SPENCER 
Civil No. 970300098 QT 
Judge: 
County of Salt Lake ) 
) ss 
State of Utah ) 
COMES NOW THOMAS L. SPENCER, being duly sworn upon oath, and declares the following: 
1. I am an adult, competent in all respects to testify before this court and have direct personal 
knowledge of all matters affirmed herein. 
2. I am a long-time Utah resident. My wife Wendy and I have owned residences in Utah since 
1974. Although we have moved during that time, proceeds from the sale of each home were used to 
purchase the next. We presently reside at property described as Lot 4075, Summit County, The 
Jeremy Ranch Plat "4.". 
n P ^ o * 
££ 
3 In July of 1997, plaintiffs filed the instant action seeking to, primarily, obtain damages for the 
alleged deprivation of pioperty described as 
Paicel #4 Beginning at a point which is North 201 37 feet and East 3050 31 feet fiom the 
Southwest comei of Section 30, Township 1 South. Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, and running thence North 28045,15" West 87^12 feet, thence North 62000,54" 
West 96 25 feet, to a point on a 330 foot radius curve to the right (radius point bears 
South 17'23'22" East), thence easterly along said curve 100 16 feet to the point of said 
curve, thence East 179.08 feet, thence South 142 49 feet to a point on a 911.0 foot radius 
curve to the left (radius point bears South 06058'39" West), thence westerly along said 
curve 151 08 feet to the point of beginning, Contains 0 63 Acre 
4. Recently, Plaintiffs and then counsel have filed a notice of lis pendens, clouding the title to Lot 
4075, Summit County, The Jeremy Ranch Plat "4." That property is the personal residence of my 
family and is not at issue m this suit 
5 My wife Wendy L Spencer, is a non-party m this action. Together we are the title holders of 
said Jeremy Ranch property, as evidenced by the Warranty Deed dated January 10, 1997, on file 
with the Summit County Recorder m book 01026, page 00009-00009 
6 Demand was made via correspondence of January 13, 1999 personally addressed to each of 
plaintiffs and each of plaintiffs' two attorneys, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-4, for 
lemoval of the lien on said property That demand was refused m writing by Mr Qumn and 
otherwise not responded to by any other addressees 
7. Plaintiffs have no interest m or claim to the lesidential property of my wife and I 
8. My wife and I are presently m the process of refinancing their home for the purposes of 
lemodelmg, saving finance charges, and paying bills. We are unable to complete that refinancing 
because of the lis pendens filed by plaintiffs and their attorneys. 
9 The lis pendens filed by plaintiffs and their attorneys is a wrongful hen. 
[){jW( 
10.1 estimate that my damages due to loss of favorable interest rates, loss of ability to increase his 
home value, and other factors that will obtain if the refinancing is not procured, will be not less than 
$200,000. 
Dated: July 22, 1999 
<*&-
Thomas L. Spencer 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2=__ day of July, 1999. 
i tuicry /I f^tirt 
7T 
// YL Notary Public Atece Morgan 
10885 South State 
Sandy, UT 84070 
My Commission Expires 
December 22, 2001 
State of Utah 
00763 
10 I estimate that rny damages due to loss of favorable interest raiss loss of ability :o increase his 
home value, and other factors that will obtain if :he refinancing is not procured will be no: less* than 
$200,000 
Dated Julv 22,1999 
Thomas L. Spencer 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
C££. 
<~ 6/ 
day of July, 1999 
Notary Public 
Alece Moroan 
10885 Soutrf State 
Sandy, UT 84070 
My Commission Expires 
December 22, 2001 
State of Utah 
Timothy Miauel Willardson # 4443 
Denver C. Snuffer #3032 
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE 
Attorneys for Tom Spencer 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone (801) 576-1400 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
PAUL BYINGTON, an individual, JAMES I AFFJDAVITX)F TIMOTHY MIGUEL 
WEBSTER, an individual, and SUMMIT WILLARDSON 
CONDO 4, a Utah Partnership 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Civil No. 970600098 QT 
THOMAS L. SPENCER, an individual, 
GEORGE T. GAMBLE, an individual, 
SPENCER-GAMBLE DEVELOPMENT 
PARTNERSHIP, a Utah partnership, and Judge: Pat B. Brian 
JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION, INC., a 
Utah Corporation 
Defendants. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
) ss 
State of Utah ) 
COMES NOW TIMOTHY MIGUEL WILLARDSON, being duly sworn upon oath, and declares 
the following: 
1. I am an adult, competent in all respects to testify before this court and have direct personal 
knowledge of all matters affirmed herein. 
2. My client, Mr. Spencer, has consistently directed me to take every action feasible to defend 
Holmes and obtain a prompt dismissal of the action as to Holmes. I have followed that direction. 
r~^ ; K'. '••••- ..t CJ"~C i ,C i . " V—.X\. 
p (\ r~ »-H <-\ 
All documents filed on my behalf m this case were drafted with the idea of removing Holmes from 
the suit and defending their title to the property In every instance where we had a practicable 
opportunity to attempt to defend Holmes or attempt to get them dismissed fiom the action, we took 
that action Notwithstanding, my efforts to defend Holmes, Holmes elected to procure their own 
attorney and elected to keep all communications related to their defense between themselves and 
Mi*. Maak It was solely because of Holmes unilateral action that less than all of Holmes' title 
defense was handled by me 
3. I spent a maximum of 73.25 hours during 1997 and a maximum of 57.25 hours during 1998 
and 1999 doing all of the same things as were done by Holmes' counsel in this action, as well as 
taking care of additional matters, such as the motions to dismiss that were prosecuted on behalf of 
Holmes, among others The total hours expended amount to approximately 1/2 of the time for 
which Holmes is seeking reimbursement. 
4. I believe that the fees being sought here are both unreasonable and unnecessary. Had Holmes 
accepted Mi*. Spencer's offer to defend them they would not have been incurred at all and since 
Holmes' attorney has apparently expended almost twice what I have, while defending a narrower set 
of issues, the amount of the fees seems excessive. 
5. I diafted the alternative denial of paragraph 7 of Holpies' cross-claim J^ecause Holmes ignored 
Mi". Spencer's offer to defend and never provided either my client or I with any communication 
which would allow us to defend them beyond what was done. We did file motions to dismiss, 
undertook discovery, and did all other acts we could to remove Holmes from the suit, including 
joining in the motion for summary judgment which ultimately succeeded m accomplishing that end 
0(T< 
6 Plaintiffs were not parties to the suit m which a lis pendens was once filed upon the property 
and were not named m any way therein 
Dated: Jul^22^1999 
-imothy Miguel Willardson 
Subscnbed and sworn to before me this day of July, 1999. 
Notary •_ i ~ Date- > / : L O / ^ 
WGtaiy pu&ljc 
}0m South State 
.^WKtyUtah 84070 
"wy commission Expm 
March 24, 2003 
State of Utah 
U u f o i 
Patricia A. O'Rorke. #2252 
O'RORKE & ASSOCIATES 
6965 Union Park Center, Suite 450 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801)569-3131 
Telefax- (801) 569-3434 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL BYINGTON. an individual, 
JAMES WEBSTER, an individual, and 
SUMMIT CONDO 4, a Utah partnership 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
THOMAS L. SPENCER, an individual; 
GEORGE T. GAMBLE, an individual; 
SPENCER-GAMBLE DEVELOPMENT 
PARTNERSHIP, a Utah partnership; and 
JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATED ORDER 
DISMISSING COUNTERCLAIM 
Case No. 970300098 QT 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Based upon the stipulation of Plaintiffs Paul Byington, James Webster and Summit 
Condo 49 a Utah partnership. b}r and through their attorney, Patricia A. O'Rorke. and Defendant 
John Holmes Construction, Inc., a Utah corporation ("Holmes"), by and through its attorney, 
Bruce A. Maak, and the record in this action, and good cause appearing therefore, 
1 00eS53 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. On or about September 12, 1997, Holmes filed its Answer, Counterclaim and 
Crossclaim. Its Counterclaim sought a Decree quieting title in Holmes as against Plaintiffs and 
all those claiming by, through and under Plaintiffs in and to certain property and certain other 
relief. 
2. An Order Granting Summary Judgment dated October 27, 1998 herein dismissed 
the Plaintiffs' Complaint against Holmes with prejudice and upon its merits, adjudicated that 
Plaintiffs have no claim to the property in question, and granted certain other relief, including an 
award of costs, to Holmes. 
3. The Order Granting Summary Judgment fully adjudicated Holmes's Counterclaim, 
and there exist no further claims remaining to be adjudicated between Plaintiffs and Holmes. 
4. Plaintiffs have paid Holmes' costs in the amount of $2,643. 
ENTERED this / 7 day of August, 1999. 
BY THE COURT 
Honorable Pat B. Brian / 
Third District Judse 
A'y^S1 
Stipulated and approved: 
O'RORKE & ASSOCIATES 
/ 
!
-.-*/ AdsiAsts&X. 
/J r-] I / (J\/-JL 
Patricia A. O'Rorke 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
v , 
""'.!,!„;': v 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE 
& LOVEI 
faak 
jys for Defendant 
John Holmes Construction, Inc. 
00858 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and con-ect copy of the foregoing STIPULATED 
ORDER DISMISSING COUNTERCLAIM was sen'ed by U.S. Mail, First Class, postage 
prepaid, on the , ' ^ day of August, 1999 on: 
Frederick A. Jackman 
1327 South 800 East. Suite 110 
Orem,UT 84097 
Brace A. Maalc 
PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN, GEE & LOVELESS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Timothy Miguel Willardson 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE 
10855 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
/ ' L H-i-t —'— A f~t(<» ' : Lc 
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Timothy Miguel Willardson 4443 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 3032 
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE 
Attorneys for Defendant Thomas L. Spencer 
and Spencer-Gamble Partnership 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Telephone: (801) 576-1400 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL BYINGTON, an individual, JAMES 
WEBSTER, an individual, and SUMMIT 
CONDO 4, a Utah partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THOMAS L. SPENCER, an individual; 
GEORGE T. GAMBLE, an individual; 
SPENCER-GAMBLE DEVELOPMENT 
PARTNERSHIP, a Utah partnership; and 
JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION, INC. 
Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
REPLY TO "DEFENDANT 
HOLMES' RESPONSE TO 
SPENCER'S OBJECTION TO 
HOLMES' PROPOSED JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF JOHN HOLMES 
CONSTRUCTION AND AGAINST 
THOMAS L. SPENCER" 
Case No. 970600098 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
COMES NOW Defendant Thomas Spencer and replies to Holmes Construction's 
memorandum as follows: 
1. Holmes' memorandum to which this Reply is merely a restatement of the 
argument that Holmes has put forward before. Holmes' memorandum contains no citations to 
the record and does nothing to clear up the question of what actually was announced by the 
Court at the conclusion of the October 6th hearing. In addition to that shortcoming, the 
1 "I » r - : , 0 
memorandum states as established or stipulated a number of items which are disputed by 
Defendant Spencer. 
2. With regard to paragraph 7 Holmes' memorandum asserts that the parties agreed 
that Holmes' paragraph 7 "should be adopted." The undersigned did not agree that it should 
be adopted, only that the Court could adopt it if the details of what was actually plead were 
unimportant to its rulings. 
3. With respect to paragraph 8 of Holmes' proposed order, the memorandum 
completely misinterprets Spencer's position. Spencer's position with respect to the alleged 
duty to defend was that was an allegation of a legal conclusion and that was a legal conclusion 
which, under the definition and statutes related to warranty of title, they were obligated to 
deny. Spencer has previously pointed out that Holmes has never done anything to allow a 
defense to be maintained by Spencer and to call the two sentence allegation of a legal 
conclusion in a pleading a sufficient tender, particularly since Holmes had already selected 
their own counsel and mounted their own defense, is factually unwarranted and legally 
unsound. 
4. As has been pointed out both in previous memoranda and in oral argument, 
there is nothing on the record that shows that there was an irremediable conflict of interest. In 
addition, the record is clear that Holmes did nothing to raise any potential conflict of interest. 
Far from being a good faith attempt to have Spencer defend the action on behalf of Holmes, 
Holmes' conduct with respect to this matter has been to make its own decisions, mount its own 
defense, hire its own lawyer and then to attempt to get Spencer to pay for it on a retroactive 
2 
basis by bootstrapping a single two sentence allegation with absolutely no good faith effort 
being taken toward allowing Spencer to defend. Had Holmes actually requested that Spencer 
undertake a defense, there would have been some communication as least with Mr. Spencer. 
As is shown in the attached documents, Holmes' title insurance company had a specific written 
contractual obligation to notify Spencer in writing if they wanted indemnification. There is no 
evidence in the record that that was done, because it was not done. 
5. With respect to paragraph 10 Holmes' memorandum asserts two contradictory 
things: The first is that Holmes' proposed order paragraph 10 includes items that were briefed 
and argued only; the second is that that expansive extension of the Court's actual holding was 
part of the Court's holding. In fact the Court made none of the findings which Holmes is 
attempting to have this Court adopt retroactively. 
6. As was discussed in our telephone conference call, the proper way to resolve 
this is to have Your Honor review the record and then make an appropriate decision regarding 
the two proposed orders. The undersigned is confident that at the conclusion of that review it 
is Spencer's proposed form of order that will be entered rather that Holmes'. 
DATED this / 7 ; day of November, 1999. 
NEL^OS^SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
Timothy Miguel Willardson 
Attorney for Defendants Thomas L. Spencer 
and Spencer-Gamble Development 
3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to either be placed in the United States mail, first class, 
postage prepaid; faxed; and/or hand-delivered; a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
REPLY TO "DEFENDANT HOLMES' RESPONSE TO SPENCER'S OBJECTION TO -
HOLMES' PROPOSED JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION 
AND AGAINST THOMAS L. SPENCER" to the following: 
Patricia A. O'Rorke 
GIAQUE, CROCKETT, BENDINGER & 
PETERSON 
170 South Main, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Mr. Frederick Jackman 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 210 
Orem, UT 84097 
Sent via: 
i .Mail 
te— 
Facsimile 
Hand-delivery 
Sent via: 
1Mail 
—v— 
Facsimile 
Hand-delivery 
Bruce R. Baird 
201 South Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Sent via: 
I Mail 
Facsimile 
Hand-delivery 
Bruce A. Maak 
Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless 
185 S State Street, Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
Sent via: 
i / Mail 
Facsimile 
Hand-delivery 
DATED this day of November, 1999 
• ' ^ n 
u 
u i -.: (*. 
GRANTEE'S ADDRESS 
22401 W A R R A N T Y D E E D 
THOMAS L. SPENCER g r a n t o r 
f P21RK CITY County of SUMMIT S t a t e of 
U, "T h e r e b y CONVEY (S) AND WARRANT (S) TO 
JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION 
g r a n t e e 
of PARK CITY County of SUMMIT State of Utah 
for the sum of TEN DOLLARS AND ai'IIER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION DOLLARS 
the following described tract of land in Summit County, 
State of Utah, to-wit: 
REFER TO LEGAL DESCRIPTION ATTACHED HERETO 
SUBJECT TO EASEMENTS, RESTRICTIONS AND RIGHTS OF WAY CURRENTLY OF RECORD, 
AND GENERAL PROPERTY TAXES FOR THE YEAR 1996 AND THEREAFTER. 
WITNESS the hand(s) of said grantor(s) this Septeanber 10, 1996 
Signed in the presence of 
THOMAS L. SPENCER 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT 
) ss. 
On 
before me, THOMAS L. SPENCER 
September 11, 19 S 6 , personally appeared 
the signer (s) of the foregoing instrument, whis being by me duly sworn, 
acknowledged to me that executed the same\ 
My Commission Expires: l\-J\-^'^) 
NdriRY PUBLIC 
Residing at; ' 1 V^IL-CX-^ 
ooLrw M SUSAN JOHNSON (WD Rev.6-87) fj j / \\ ' ) 
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LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
The land referred to is situated in Summit, and is described as follows. 
BEGINNING AT A POINT WHICH IS NOPTH 89 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 54 SECONDS 
EAST 2781.38 TEET ALONG THE SECTION LINE FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF 
SECTION 30, TOWNSHIP 1 SOU1H, RANGE 4 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, 
AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 239 84 FEET TO A POINT ON A 180 00 FOOT RADIUS 
CURVE TO THE LEFT (RADIUS POINT BEARS NORTH 1 DEGREES 11 MINUTES 4 4 
SECONDS WEST), AND RUNNING ALONG SAID CURVE 8 6 3 0 FEET TO A POINT ON £ 
330.00 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THL RIGHT (RADIUS POINT BEARS SOUTH 28 
DEGREES 39 MINUTES 55 SECONDS EAST), AND RUNNING ALONG SAID CURVE 165 10 
FEET; THENCE EAST 179.08 TEET, THENCE SOUTH 132 41 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 23 
DEGREES 54 MINUTES 56 SECONDS EAST 4 9.33 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 119 17 FEET 
TO THE SECTION LINE, THENCE SOUTH 89 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 54 SECONDS WEST 
440.00 FEET ALONG SAID LINE TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
LESS THAT PORTION THAT LIES WITHIN QUAIL MEADOW TOWNHOUSE, PHASE 1. 
LESS THAT PORTION THAT LIES WITHIN QUAIL MEADOW TOWNHOUSE, PHASE 2. 
/ 
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LESS; BEGINNING AT A POINT WHICH IS NORTH 89 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 54 
SECONDS EAST 3045.18 FEET ALONG THE SECTION LINE AND NORTH 172 07 FEET 
FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SECTION 30, TOWNSHIP 1 SOUTH, RANGE 4 EAST, 
SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, SAID POINT ALSO BEING ON A 921 0 0 FOOT 
RADIUS CURVE TO THE LEFT (RADIUS POINT BEARS SOUTH 2 DEGREES 4 9 MINUTES 
56 SECONDS EAST); AND RUNNING THENCE ALONG SAID CURVE 111.20 FEET, 
THENCE SOUTH 80 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 00 SECONDS WEST 74.84 FEET TO A POINT 
ON A 39.00 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT (RADIUS POINT BEARS NORTH 9 
DEGREES 45 MINUTES 00 SECONDS WEST); AND RUNNING ALONG SAID CURVE 67.90 
FEE1; THENCE NORTH 54.78 FEET TO A POINT ON THE SOUTHERLY RIGHT OF WAY 
LINE Or MEADOW LOOP ROAD, SAID POINT ALSO BEING ON A 180.00 TOOT RADIUS 
CURVE TO THE LEFT (RADIUS POINT BEARS NORTH 12 DEGREES 06 MINUTES 04 
SECONDS WEST; AND RUNNING ALONG SAID CURVE 52.04 FEET TO A POINT ON A 
3 3 0.00 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT (RADIUS POINT BEARS SOUTH 2 8 
DEGREES 39 MINUTES 55 SECONDS EAST); AND RUNNING ALONG SAID CURVE C4.9J 
FEET, THENCE SOUTH 62 DEGREES 0 0 MINUTES 54 SECONDS EAST 9 6.26 TEET, 
THENCE SOUTH 28 DEGREES 45 MINUTES 15 SECONDS EAST 75 98 FEET TO THE 
POINT OF BEGINNING. 
LESS; BEGINNING AT A POINT WHICH IS NORTH 89 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 54 
SECONDS EAST 3085.38 FEET ALONG THE SECTION LINE FROM THE SOUTHWEST 
CORNER OF SECTION 30, TOWNSHIP 1 SOUTH, RANGE 4 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND 
MERIDIAN; AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 6 DEGREES 3 0 MINUTES 54 SECONDS WEST 
d I 125.00 FEET; THENCE NORTH 28 DEGREES 45 MINUTES 15 SECONDS WEST 7.05 
\*-l TEET TO A POINT ON A 879.00 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT (RADIUS POINT 
BEARS SOUTH 1 DEGREES 29 MINUTES 3 8 SECONDS EAST); AND RUNNING ALONG 
SAID CURVE 154.05 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 119.17 FEET TO THE SECTION LINE; 
THENCE SOUTH 89 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 54 SECONDS WEST 136.00 FEET ALONG 
v SAID SECTION LINE TO THE POINT Or BEGINNING. 
ORDER NO. 224 01 
Accepting Office ASSOCIATED 1 ITc COMPAQ 
Address 1755 PROSPECTOR AVE, PAR) CITY 
OR# 22A01 Filing Reference 22401 
INDEMNITY AGREEMENT III 
( O f f - R e c o r d H a t t e r s ) 
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this 11 day oSeptember 1996
 ( by and between 
THOMAS L SPENCER 
hereinafter (collectively if more than one) referred to as "lndcimitor," and ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY 
hereinafter referred to as " ASSOCIATED TITLE '*. 
1 Indemnitor is the owner of and/or has some interest in that certain real property hereinafter referred to ns 
"the property," located in the County of SUMMIT , State of Utah, described as follows. 
REFER TO LEGAL DESCRIPTION ATTACHED HERETO 
2. Indemnitor is contemplating encumbering and/or selling the property and has requested ASSOCIATED TITLE 
to issue its policy of title insurance in connection theiewith 
3. An examination of the Official Records of said county and other aspects of title to the property discloses the 
following matter or matters not shown b/ such Official Records heieinafter refeired to as "the off-record matter" 
affecting the property. 
ANY PERSON CLAIMING AN INTEREST PURSUANT TO JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT ATTACHED AS 
EXHIBIT "A" TO THE COMPLAINT IN THE ACTION ENTITLED "WILLIAM JOSEP11SON AND THOMAS 
L. SPENCER IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH CLAIM 
NO. 9603006OPR. 
4. Indemnitor, regardless of his interest in oi rel.it lonship to the Pioperty, has an interest in the issuance of and 
desires ASSOCIATED TITLE to issue its policy or policies of title insurance insuring an owner 
or owners of the Property, and/or insuring holders of mortgages or deeds of trust encumbering the property against 
loss by ieason of the off-record matter 
5. ASSOCIATED TITLE is willing to consider the issuance of such policy or policies of title 
insuiance as Indemnitor has requested, insuring against loss by reason of the existence of the off-record matter, 
however, ASSOCIATED TITLE sh.jl I determine whether to issue each policy based on reliance on the 
covenants, conditions, representations and warranties of Indemnitor herein made, and upon a determination by 
ASSOCIATED TITLE that each and every covenant to be performed by Indemnitor has, as a condition 
precedent to such issuance, been performed. h 
IN CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUANCE by ASSOCIATED TITLE of each policy of title insurance as 
ASSOCIATED TITLE shall decide to issue insuring against loss by reason of the existence of the 
off-record matter, Indemnitor agrees as follows: 
6 Indemnitor shall deposit with ASSOCIATED TITLE 
AUTHORITY OF THOMAS L. SPENCER TO EXECUTE WARRANTY DEED TO JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION, AS GRANTEE 
as partial security for this indemnification. 1 
Indemnitor shall, concurrently herewith, submit to ASSOCIATED TITLE an audited financial statement, 
or the ASSOCIATED TITLE form financial statement if no audited statement is available and, if 
ASSOCIATED Tl H E elects to accept an unaudited statement from Indemnitor, which statement shall 
accurately represent the financial condition of Indemnitor. Indemnitor further agrees to amend such statement upon 
the occurence of any event which would alter or in any respect change said financial condition by reducing the net 
worth, result in a reduction of liquidity, or other similar manner which would be materal to ASSOCIATED TITLE 's 
descision to continue issuing policies in reliance on the financial condition and this agreement. 
(In the event more than one person is Indemnitor, each such person shall comply with this paragraph.) Any mis-statement 
of such condition, or failure to submit an amendment thereto or omitting to submit an amendment, as to the Indemnitor so 
rms-stating or omitting to submit on amendment shall constitute actual fraud against ASSOCIATED TITLE 
such that any obligation incurred by ASSOCIATED TITLE under this Indemnity shall not be dischargeable in 
• . . — , „ , , . , . , , , , , , . , - . . . . • ' I 
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any insolvency proceeding whether involuntary or voluntary and further, shall constitute actuol fr^ud against 
ASSOCIATED TITLE for any and all purposes 
7 Indemnitor hereby promises and agrees that ASSOCIATED TITLE shall have and is aranted the right 
at any tune to examine the booJ s accounts, ana recoras of Indemr to- pe-ta r "g ^o + nanc a condition or inoenini ior 
and indemnitor will upon request furnish to ASSOCIATED TITLE for examination all such books accounts 
and iecoids and such further assurances as ma/ be required by /SS0C1ATED "ITLE for its or its insured s 
protection fiom liability 
£3 In the event that any action is filed in Idw or equit> or any procedure instituted relating to the off record matter 
indemnitor agrees to notify ASSOCIATED TITLE in writing of such action or procedure of which Indemnitor 
shall b/ uny means whatsoever become aware withu three (3) days of acquistion of knowledge or such action or procedure 
9 Upon the filing of any action at law or in equity of any pi ocedure relating to the off-record matter or an/ time 
ASSOCIATED TITLE shall, in its absolute subjective opinion deem necessary in order to protect 
itself or its insured or insureds, ASSOCIATED TITLE shall have absolute right to demand and 
Indemnitor agrees to comply therewith that Indemnitor 
A In situations where the payment of any sum of money will discharge or eliminate the affect of the off record matter 
as to Lhe property, Indemnitor shall upon demand of ASSOCIATED TITLE cause such sum of money as is 
sufficient to so discharge or eliminate the off record matter to be paid in such a manner as to effect such discharge 
or el limnatt on or 
B In situations where affirmative legal action or proceedings in law or in equity are necessary to effect discharge 
or elimination of the off record matter as to any effect it may have on the Property Indemnitor shall, upon demand 
of ASSOCIATED TITLE , cause counsel acceptable to ASSOCIATED TITLE to institute 
such action or procedure as will so discharge or eliminate the effect of the off record matter as to the property, 
and to cause to be delivered to ASSOCIATED TITLE a written representation by such counsel to the 
effect that such counsel has accepted employment as counsel to commence and vigorously prosecute to conclusion such 
action or procedure, or 
C In situations where any action or procedure concerning Die off record matter is instituted by any party other than 
ASrUClATED TITLE or Indemnitor, Indemnitor shall, upon demand by ASSOCIATED TITLE , 
cause such action or procedure to be timely defended and resisted by counsel acceptable to ASSOCIATED TITLE 
which counsel will piotect ASSOCIATED TITLE and any person or insured to whom ASSOCIATED TITLE 
may hnvp possible liability as n result of issuance or a policy or policies of title insui ance pursuant to this agi ee 
ment, and cause to be delivered to ASSOCIATED TITLE a written representation by such counsel to the effect 
that such counsel has accepted employment as counsel to defend any such action or resist any such procedure and will 
undertake any and all steps necessary to protect ASSOCIATED TITLE and its insured or insureds, or 
D Take action with respect to the off-record matter as ASSOCIATED TITLE shut I, m its absolute subjective 
discretion authorize Indemnitor in wnting to undertake, provided that any such authority shall not be a waiver 
by ASSOCIATED TITLE to, at any Lime, require Indemnitor to comply with subparagraphs A, B and 
C above, within five (5) days of ASSOCIATED TITLE 's written revocation of authority to take action 
other than that under subparagraphs A, B and C, and demand for Indemnitor to comply with subparagraphs A B and C 
above 
Jn the event Indemnitor foils to comply with subparaqraphs A, B, C or D, above, ASSOCIATED TITLE 
shall hnve the right in addition to any and alt recourse available to ASSOCIATED TITLE under this 
agieement or under I > or equity but not the obligation, to take or do any act, in the name of Indemnitor or otherwise, 
as ASSOCIATED TITLE shirt I, ir U s absolute subjective opinion deem necessary or desirable to 
protect U s interests under this agreement, or the interests of its insured or insurcdb 
10 Notwithstanding any other recourse available to ASSOCIATLD TITLE under this agreement or other 
wise at law or in equity, Indemnitor (and each of them jointly and sever Iy if more than one) hereby agrees to hold and 
and save ASSOCIATED TITLE harmless and to protect and indemnify ASSOCIATED TITLE 
from and against any and all liabilities or claims of liability, losses, costs, charges expenses and damages of any 
kind or character whatsoevei, including reasonable attorney's fees incurred or sustained by ASSOCIATED TITLE 
by reason of or arising out of the off-matter, which ASSOCIATED TITLE may incu- oi sustain directly 
or indirectLy, under any policy of title insurance issued pursuant to this agreement, or which ASSOCIATED TITLE 
may sustain or incur in any other action at taw or in equity under any theory of recovery as a result of the existence 
of the off record matter 
11 Indemnitor agrees that ar y monies advanced by ASSOCIATED TITLE pursuant to this 
agreement or by ASSOCIATED TITLE 's exercise of any rights hereunder given shall be repaid by 
Indemnitor to ASSOCIATED TITLE with interest thereon at four percent (4%) above the then prevailing 
prime rate as charged by Bank of America at date of the advance of any sum or sums hereunder, but in no event to exceed 
ten percent (10%) per annum, from the date of such advance, within ten (10) days of ASSOCIATED TITLE 
demand therefor 
12 Indemnitor further agrees that any monies or other security deposited with ASSOCIATED TITLE may 
without any demand or notice to indemnitor whatsoever be used by ASSOCIATED TITLE to discharge any 
liability for which ASSOCIATED TITLE is indemnified hereunder, including but not hunted to using 
any portion of such monies or security up to the whule thereof to cause or obtain a discharge or elimination of the 
effect of the off record matter on the property 
13 Where, in ASSOCIATED TITLE 's absolute subjective opinion, all matters for which 
ASSOCIATED TITLE is indemnifled hereunde are resolved in such a manner that ASSOCIATED TITLE 
can hove no further liabiht> under its policy or policies ASSOCIATED TITLE may at 
ASSOCIATED TITLE 's sole option return or oraer, budi monies o~ secur t, as ra, ha e been dcpnsirpri 
by Indemnitor hereunder to Indemnito- No i eturn of such secunt> shall be construed as a termination of indemnitor s 
duties hereunder or of this agreement 
14 Indemnitor recognizes and acknowledges that in the event of any default or failure by indemnitor to perform as 
agreed heiein would give ASSOCIATED TITLE tlie right to exercise any and ull remedies available nt law 
or in equity including but not limited to injunctive relief, specific performance, and damages for breach of the 
terms hereof 
15 The failure of ASSOCIATED TJTLE to demand by Indemnitor the performance of any act hereunder 
shall not be construed as a waiver of ASSOCIATED TITLE 's right to demand, at an> subsequent tune such 
performance 
16 This Agi eement is between Indemnitor and ASSOCIATED TITLE only, and is not intended to be nor 
shall it be construed as being for the benefit of any third party or parties 
17 In the event any provision of this Agreement shall be held invalid or unenforceable by any court of competent 
jurisdiction, such holding shall not invalidate or fender unenforceable any other provision hereof 
10 This Agreement contains the entire agreement of tlie parties, and shall not be modified except by an instrument in 
writing executed by all of tlie parties hereto 
19 A The terms of this Agreement shall hove the following meaning unless the context requires otherwise 
(1) The term "Propei ty" shall lefer to that cci tain property or an interest therein as set out above, and include 
any and all poitions thereof 
(2) Tlie term "policy" shall refer to and include a policy or policies of title insurance and/or endorsements 
thereto. 
B. Whore more than one person is included as Indemni tor, tlie obligation undertaken by Indemnitor shall be joint and 
several. 
C. The singular number shall include the pluial number throughout this Agreement. 
D. This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of and bind the personal representatives, successsors, and assigns of 
the parties hereto. 
20. This Agreement shall be interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah, and Indemnitor hereby agiees 
to submit himself to the competent jurisdiction of any Utah Court or Federal Court having competent jurisdiction of 
ASSOCIATED TITLE 's choosing, and to make no objection to venue therein, should any action in law or 
or equity be necessary to enforce or interpret this agreement If any action at law or in equity is necessary to enforce 
or interpret the terms of this agreement, Indemnitor further agrees to reimburse ASSOCIATED TITLE 
for any costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and/or necessary disbursements for such action, in addition to any other 
relief to which ASSOCIATED TITLE may be entitled 
21. NOTWITHSTANDING AMY POSSIBLE DIFFERENCE IN THE PARITY OF THE PARTIES HERETO, IT IS UNDERSTOOD BY INDEMNITOR THAT 
ASSOCIATED TITLE IS UUDERTAkING A RISK SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER THAN THAT UNDERTAKEN IN THE NORMAL 
COURSE OF PROVIDING TITLE INSURANCE POLICIES AND RELATED SERVICES BY ENTERING INTO THIS AGREEMENT AND ISSUING 
POLICIES TO TJTLE INSURANCE IN RELIANCE HEREON AND, TllERFORE, INDEMNITOR HEREBY DECLARES ITS WILLINGNESS TO ENTER 
INTO THIS AGREEMENT AMD INDUCING ASSOCIATED TITLE TO ENTER INTO THIS AGREEMENT, REAL121NG THAI 
INDEMNITOR'S BEST INTEREST, IN THE OPINION OF THE INDEMNITOR, IS BEING BEST SERVED THEREBY. 
INDIVIDUALS 
Q120G 
COMIdONWEALTH LAND TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY 
COMMITMENT FOR TITLE INSURANCE 
Effective Date : July 12, 1996 
>olicy or Policies to be issued: 
X ALTA Owner's Policv (10-17-92) 
SCHEDULE A 
at 8:00 A.M. 
Commitment No. 50942 
Amount 
$ 
X Standard Coverage Extended Coverage Premium S 
Proposed Insured : JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Utah Corporation 
X ALTA Loan Policy (10-17-92) 
Standard Coverage X Extended Coverage 
Proposed Insured : 
Premium $ 
Endorsements 
The estate or interest in the land described or referred to in this Commitment and 
covered herein is Fee Simple 
and is at the effective date hereof vested in: 
THOMAS L. SPENCER (PARCEL 1) ; RICHARD UHL HOVEY and LISA HOPKINS HOVEY, Trustees or 
Successors of the RICHARD and LISA HOVEY FAMILY TRUST, U/A dated September 27, 1989 and 
DONALD L. CRAIG (PARCEL 2) 
The land referred to in this commitment is situated in the County of SUMMIT 
State of Utah, and described as follows: 
See Exhibit "A" 
Address : 
Escrow Officer: ALLAN 
COMMONWEALTH LAND TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY 
Counter Signec 
Authorised Officer or Agent 
:>r Questions regarding Items disclosed in this commitment please call at 264-8889. 
F i l e No. 50S42-AB 
LL, DESCRIPTION 
E x h i b i t "A 
Lnnmg at a point which is North 89 degrees 15'54" East 2781.38 feet along 
Section line from the Southwest corner of Section 30, Township 1 South, 
je 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North 23 9.84 feet 
= point on a 180.00 foot radius curve to the left (radius point bears North 
egrees 11'44" West); and running along said curve 86.30 feet to a point on a 
.00 foot radius curve to the right (radius point bears South 28 degrees 
55" East); and running along said curve 165.10 feet; thence East 179.08 
t; thence South 132.41 feet; thence South 23 degrees 54'5G" East 49.33 feet; 
nee South 119.17 feet to the Section line; thence South 89 degrees 15'54" 
t 440.00 feet along said line to the point of beginning. 
s that portion that lies within QUAIL MEADOW TOWNHOUSE, PHASE 1. 
s that portion that lies within QUAIL MEADOW TOWNHOUSE, PHASE 2. 
s; Beginning at a point which is North 89 degrees 15'54" East 3 04 5.18 feet 
>ng the Section line and North 172.07 feet from the Southwest corner of 
•tion 30, Township 1, South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said 
.nt also being en a 921.00 foot radius curve to the left (radius pcim bears 
Lth 2 degrees 49'56" East); and running thence along said curve 111.20 feet; 
:nce along said curve 111.20 feet; thence South 80 degrees 15'00" West 74.84 
t to a point on a 39.00 foot radius curve to the right (radius point bears 
:th 9 degrees 45'00" West); and running along said curve 67.90 feet; thence 
:th 54.78 feet to a point on the Southerly right of way line Meadow Loop 
ad, said point also being on a 180.00 foot radius curve to the left (radius 
m t bears North 12 degrees 06'04n West); and running along sard curve 52.04 
Bt to a point on a 330.00 foot radius curve to the right (radius point bears 
nth 28 degrees 39'55n East); and running along said curve 64.93 feet; thence 
uth 62 degrees 00'54" East 96.26 feet; thence South 28 degrees 45'15" East 
.98 feet to the point of beginning. 
ss; Beginning at a point which is North 89 degrees 15;54n East 3 085.38 feet 
ong the Section line from the Southwest corner of Section 30, Township 1 
uth, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence North 6 
grees 30'54" West 125.00 feet; thence North 28 degrees 45'15" West 7.05 feet 
a point on a 879.00 foot radius curve to the right (radius point bears Sout 
degree 29'38" East); and running along said curve 154.05 feet; thence South 
9.17 feet to the Section Line, thence South 89 degrees 15'54" West 136.00 
et along said Section line to the point of beginning. 
iRCEL 2 : 
aginning at a point which is North 8 9 degrees 15'54" East 3 045.18 feet along 
is section line and North 172.07 feet from the Southwest corner of Section 3C 
Dwnship 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said point also 
sing on a 921.00 foot radius curve to the left (Radius point bears South 2 
agrees 49'56" East); and running thence along said curve 11.20 feet; thence 
uth 80 degrees 15'00" West 7.84 feet to a point on a 39.00 foot radius curv-
c the right (radius point bears North 9 degrees 45'00" West); and running 
Continued) 
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LEGAL CONTINUED 
along said curve 67.90 feet; thence North 54.78 feet to a point: 
on the Southerly right: of way line of Meadow Loop Read, said 
point also being on a 180.00 foot: radius curve to the left 
(radius point bears North 12 degrees 06'04" West); and running 
along said curve 52.04 feet to a point on a 330.00 foot radius 
curve to the right: (radius point bears South 2 8 degrees 39'55" 
East); and running along said curve 64.93 feet; thence South 62 
degrees 00'54M East 96.26 feet; thence South 28 degrees 45'IS" 
East 75.93 feet to the point of beamninc. 
p ' rs r\ f 
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COMMITMENT? FOR TITLE INSURANCE 
SCHEDULE B 
File Number: 50942 
Schedule 3 of the policy or policies to be issued will contain exceptions to the following 
ters unless tne same are disposed of to the satisfaction of tne Company 
Any facrs, ngnts, interests, or claims whicn are not shown by the public records but whic 
could be ascertained by an inspection of the land or w m c n may be asserted by perscns m 
possession, or claiming to be m possession, tnereof. 
Easenents liens, encumbrances, or claims tnereof, which are not shown D V the public 
records 
Discrepancies, conflicts m boundary lines, sncrtage m area, encroachments, or any other 
facts which a correct survey of the land would disclose, and which are not shown by the 
public records. 
Any lien, or right to a lien, imposed by tne law for services, labor, or material 
heretofore or hereafter furnisned, whicn lien, or rignt to a lien, is not shown by the 
oublic record 
(a) Unpatented mining claims; (b) reservations or exceptions m patents or m Acts 
authorizing the issuance tnereof, (c) Indian treaty or aboriginal rignts, including, but 
not limited to, easements or equitable servitudes, or, (d) water rights, claims or title t 
water, whether or not tne matters excepted under (a) , (b) , (c) , or (d) are snown by tne 
public records. 
Taxes or assessments which are not now payable or which are not shown as existing liens b^  
the records of any taxing authority that levies taxes or assessments on real property or } 
tne public records, proceedings D V a public agency w m c h may result in taxes or 
assessments, or notices of such proceedings, whether or not snown ny the records of sucn 
agency or by the public records 
Any service, installation, connection, maintenance or constuction charges for sewer, wate 
electricity, or garbage collection or disposal or other utilites unless shown as an 
existing lien by the public records. 
Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters, if any created, first 
appearing m the public records or attaching subsequent to the effective date hereof but 
prior to tne date the proposed insured acquires of record for value the estate or mteres 
or mortgage thereon covered by tnis Commitment. 
Taxes for the year 1996 now a lien not yet due and payable. Taxes for the year 1995 HAVE 
NOT BEEN PAID m the amount of $68.99, plus penalties and interest Property ID No 
PP-S1-B. For further information contact the SUMMIT County Treasurer at 336-4451. 
(PARCEL 1) 
Taxes for the year 1996 now a lien not yet due and payable. Taxes for tne year 1995 
have been paid in the amount of $88 74 Property I D. No PP-91-B-1. (PARCEL 2) 
tmued) 
EXCEPTIONS CONTINUED 
The subject property lies within the boundaries of tne PARK CITY SEWER. DISTRICT and is 
sujD]ect to any and all cnarges and assessments tnereof. 
Pnone* 645-5000 
Tne subject property lies witnm tne boundaries of tine WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERVANCY 
DISTRICT and is sujojecz no any and all cnarges and assessments tnereof. 
Pnone: 359-4454 
The subject property lies witnm the boundaries of SNYDERVILLE SEWER and is sutject tc 
any and all charges and assessments tnereof. 
Phone: 649-7393 
The suD]ect property lies within tne boundaries of PARK CITY FIRE and is subject to 
any and all charges and assessments tnereof. 
Pnone: 649-6706 
An Easement including its terms, covenants and provisions as disclosed by instrument; 
To: THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE and TELEGRAPH COMPANY, a Colorado 
Corporation, its successors, assigns, lessees, licensees and 
agents 
Purpose- A right of way Eastment and the right to construct, operate, 
maintain and remove sucn communication and onner facilities, 
from time to time, upon, over, and across 
Recorded: March 29, 1982 as Entry No. 189886 in Book M215 at Page 702 of 
Official Records. 
AffrCtS: SAID PROPERTY 
The matters set forth m the document shown below which, among otner things, contains 
or provides for. certain easements, liens and the subordination tnereof, provisions 
relating to partition; restrictions on severability or component parts, and covenants 
conditions and restrictions, 
Recorded. July 1, 19S2 as Entry No. 193163 m Book M224 at Page 555 of 
Official Records. 
The matters contained within tnat certain Modification(s) of said covenants, 
conditions and restrictions, 
Recorded. June 14, 1988 as Entry No. 291746 in Book 481 at Page 01 of 
Official Records 
A Deed of Trust to secure an indebtedness m the amount snown oelow, and any other 
obligations secured thereby, 
Amount. $30,000 00 
Dated November 18, 1994 
Trustor: THOMAS L. SPENCER 
Trustee- FIP.ST AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH, a Utah Corporation 
Beneficiary: CYPRUS CREDIT UNION 
Recorded: November 23, 1994 as Entry No 419822 m Book 852 at Page 519 c 
Official Records. (PARCEL 2) 
tmued) 
U i - ± i 
EXCEPTIONS CONTINUED 
14. The ter^s, covenant, conditions, and restrictions of that certain "Consent Agreement" 
sy and between DONALD CRAIG, RICHARD anc U S A HOVEY, THOMAS 1 SPENCER, and Summit 
Pnn-T-T £_ ^ QI icical subdivis~ on of *~h^  CJ—*"** ^~ i"?—^^ 
Recorded July n , 1995 as Entry No. 433144 m Book 8S4 a: Page 108 of 
Official Records 
15. Tne terms, covenants, conditions, and restrictions of that certain "Consent Agreement" 
by and between DONALD CRAIG, RICHARD and LISA HOVEY', THOMAS L. SPENCER, and Summit 
County, a political subdivision of the State of Utah. 
Recorded. February 27, 1996 as Entry No 4489S7 m Book 947 at Page 411 of 
Official Records. 
16. A pending court action as disclosed by Instrument; 
Plaintiff: WILLIAM JOSEPHSON 
Defendant: THOMAS L. SPENCER 
County. Summit 
Court: THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
Civil No.: 96030O060PR 
Purpose. Action may affect the title to, or the right of possession of, 
real property. 
Recorded: April 26, 1996 as Entry No. 453039 m Book 960 at Page 521 of 
Official Records. 
TOTE: Exception Numbers 1 tnru 8 will not appear m the Mortgage Policy to be issaed 
hereunder 
OTE: Judgments have been searched m the names of THOMAS L. SPENCER, RICHARD UHL HOVEY 
and LISA HOPKINS HOVEY, trustees or successors of the RICHARD and LISA HOVEY 
FAMILY TRUST, U/A dated September 27, 198 9 and DONALD L. CRAIG for the past eignt 
years and none were found of record except as snown ar>ove 
TOTE: A cancellation fee of $12 0.00 will be billed for this commitment if a Policy of 
Tiule Insurance is not issued witnm 12 0 days 
TOTE: Any matter m dispute between you and the company may be subiect to arbitration as 
an alternative to court action pursuant to the Title Insurance Arbitration Rules 
of the American Arbitration Association, a copy of which is available on request 
from the company. Any decision reached Dy arbitration shall De binding upon both 
you and the company The arbitration award may include attorney7 s fees if allowed 
by state law and may be entered as a judgment m any court of proper 
jurisdiction. 
bTOTE . The Escrow officer assigned to this file is ALLAN. For questions regarding your 
closing please call ALLAN at 264-8888. 
This file was examined by Sean. Any questions regarding items in this commitTent 
Dlease call Sean at 264-8889. 
01 
Commitment ror Titls Insurance 
Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company, a Pennsylvania corporation, herein called the company, for a valuable con-
sideration, hereby commits to issue its policy or policies of title insurance, as identified in Schedule A, in favor of the proposed 
Insured named in Schedule A, as owner or mortgagee of the estate or interest covered hereby in the land described or referred 
to in Schedule A, upon payment of the premiums and charges therefor; all subject to the provisions of Schedules A and B and 
to the Conditions and Stipulations hereof. 
This Commitment shall be effective only when the identity of the proposed Insured and the amount of the policy or policies 
committed for have been inserted in Schedule A hereof by the Company, either at the time of the issuance of this Commitment 
or by subsequent endorsement. 
This Commitment is preliminary to the issuance of such policy or policies of title insurance and all liability and obligations 
hereunder shall cease and terminate 120 days after the effective date hereof or when the policy or policies committed for shall 
be issued, whichever first occurs, provided that the failure to issue such policy or policies is not the fault of the company. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said Company has caused its Corporate Name and Seal to be hereunto affixed; this instrument, 
including Commitment, Conditions and Stipulations attached, to become valid when countersigned by an Authorized Officer or 
Agent of the Company. 
Conditions and Stipulations 
1. The term mortgage, when used herein, shall include deed of trust, trust deed, or other security instrument. 
2. If the proposed Insured has or acquires actual knowledge of any defect, lien, encumbrance, adverse claim or other matter 
affecting the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered by this Commitment other than those shown in Schedule B 
hereof, and sh^Jil fail to disclose such knowledge to the Company in writing, the Company shall be relieved from liability for 
any loss or damage resulting from any act of reliance hereon to the extent the Company is prejudiced by failure to so disclose 
such knowledge. If the proposed Insured shall disclose such knowledge to the Company, or if the Company otherwise 
acquires actual knowledge of any such defect, lien, encumbrance, adverse claim or other matter, the Company at its option 
may amend Schedule B of this Commitment accordingly, but such amendment shall not relieve the Company from liability 
previously incurred pursuant to paragraph 3 of these Conditions and Stipulations. 
3. Liability of the Company under this Commitment shall be only to the named proposed Insured and such parties included 
under the definition of Insured in the form of policy or policies committed fo: and only for actual loss Incurred in reliance 
hereon in undertaking in good faith (a) to comply with the requirements hereof, or (b) to eliminate exceptions shown in 
Schedule B. or (c) to acquire or create the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered Dy this Commitment. In no event 
shall such Liability exceed the amount stated in Schedule A for the policy or policies committed for and such liability is 
subject to the insuring provisions, the Conditions and Stipulations, and the Exclusions from Coverage of the form of policy 
or policies committed for in favor of the proposed Insured which are hereby incorporated by reference and are made a part 
of this Commitment except as expressly modified herein. 
4. Any action or actions or rights of action that the proposed Insured may have or may bring against the Company arising out 
of the status of the title to the estate or interest or the status of the mortgage thereon covered by this Commitment must 
be based on and are subject to the provisions of this Commitment. 
This is a legally binding Cc act Utah Slate Law requires that licensed real estate agents use this form bt fluyer and the Seller may IOIUL HOUSIMO 
R E A H O P® legally agree in writing to alter or delete provisions ot this lorm II you desire legal or tax advice consult your attorney or tax advisor 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
The Buyer - T O ^ ^ V o L ' V ^ (tA^A&LMXt
 t, >^ I 0> Li offers to purchase the Properly described below and delivers 
to Brokerage as Earnest Money Deposit $ l i ^ ^ ^ in the form of Co v'AfHv-H r U&Tx<C~ to be deposited 
within three business days after Acceptance ol this offer to purchase by all parties 
CoUP)u^*J. . Q?L^\JJr(K_^ L>n'i-L\'ibO Receivea oy on (Da'e) 
Brokerage Phone Number 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
1 PROPERTY G ^ M X - M l f i A P v A n q - ^ S > TO rv "vL 
City WlvL C A T H County S ^ W \ ^ ^ v r T Utah 
1 1 Included Items Unless excluded herein this sale shall incluoe all fixtures presently attached to the Property plumbing healing air conditioning and 
venting fixtures and equipment water heater built-in appliances light fixtures and bulbs bathroom fixtures curtains and draperies and rods window and 
door screens storm doors window blinds awnings installed television antenna satellite dishes and system wall to-wall carpets automatic garage door 
opener and transmitter(s) fencing trees and shrubs The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of 
Sale with warranties as to title 
1 2 Excluded Items The following items are excluded from this sale 
PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING Buyer agrees to pay ior the Properly as follows 
\ OTTO Earnest Money Deposit 
£L Existing Loan Buyer agrees to assume and pay an existing loan in this approximate amount presently payable at $ . 
per month including principal interest (piesently at % per annum) D real estate taxes D properly insurance premium 
and D morlgage insurance premium Buyer agrees to pay any transfer and assumption fees Seller D shall D shall not be 
released from liability on said loan Any net differences between the approximate balance of the loan shown above and the actual 
balance at Closing shall be adjusted in D Cash D Other 
$ J21 Proceeds from New Loan Buyer reserves the right to apply for any of the following loans under the terms described below 
D Conventional D FHA D VA D Other Seller agrees to pay $ toward 
Discount Points and Buyer s other loan and closing costs to be allocated at Buyer s discretion 
• For a fixed rate loan Amortized and payable over years interest shall not exceed % per annum monthly principal and 
interest payment shall not exceed $ or 
D For an Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) Amortized and payable over years initial interest rate shall not exceed % per 
annum initial monthly principal and interest payments shall not exceed $ Maximum Liie Time interest rate shall not 
exceed % per annum 
Seller Financing (See attached Seller Financing Addendum) ^ 
-&* Other 
% i A V ^ I ^ O T J Balance of Purchase Price in Cash at Closing 
$ j j l ^ ^ t r o Total Purchase Price 
2 1 Existing/New Loan Application Buyer agrees to make application lor a loan specilied above within ' calendar days (Application Dale) after 
Acceptance Buyer will have made Loan Application only when Buyer has (a) completed signed and delivered to the Lender the initial loan application and 
documentation required by the Lender and (b) paid all loan application lees as required by the Lender Buyer will continue to provide the Lender with any 
additional documentation as required by the Lender If within beven calendar days after receipt of written request from Seller Buyer fails to provide to Seller 
written evidence that Buyer has made Loan Application by this Application Dale then Seller may prior to the Qualification Dale below cancel this Contract 
by pi uvidinq written notice to Buyer The Brokerage upon receipt ol a copy of such written notice shall release to Seller and Seller agrees to accept as 
Sellei s exclusive remedy the Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement of any further written authorization from Buyer 
2 2 Qualification Buyer and the Property must quality for a loan for which application has been made under section 2 1 within v()fi calendar days 
(Qualification Date) after Acceptance 1 he Property is deemed qualified if on or beJore the Qualification Date the Property in its current condition and for 
the Buyer s intended use has appraised ata value not less than the Total Purchase Price Buyer is deemed qualified if on or before the Qualification Date 
the Lender verifies in writing that Buyer has been approved as ol the verification date 
2 3 Qualification Contingency If Seller has not previously voided this Conlract as provided in Section 2 1 and either the Properly or Buyer has failed to 
qualify on or before the Qualification Date either party may cancel this Contract by providing written notice to the other party within three calendar days 
after the Qualification Date otherwise Buyer and the Propei ty arc deemed qualified The Brokerage upon receipt ol a copy ol such written notice shall 
leturn to Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement of any further written authorization of Seller 
3 CLOSING This transac lion shall be closed on or before Closing shall occur when (a) Buyer and Seller have 
signed and delivered to each other (or to the escrow/Ml^ company) all documents requued by this Conlract by the Lender by written escrow instiucttons 
and by applicable law and (b) the monies required to be paid under these documents have been delivered to the escrow/title company in the form ol 
cashier s check collected or cleared lunds Seller and Buyer shall each pay one half (112) ol the escrow Closing fee unless otherwise agreed by the parties 
in writing Taxes and assessments for the current year rents and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in this Section Unearned 
deposits on tenancies shall be transferred to Buyer at Closing Prorations set forth in this Section shall be made as of "0 date of Closing D date of 
possession D other . 
4 POSSESSION Unless otnerwise agreed in writing by the pirties Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer within 4=-. hours after Closing 
5 CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE At the signing of this Contract the listing agent S^C K . V-W^r L^ represents 
V Seller G Buyer and the selling agenfoffaik y^O^^IfttffcI^^JUepresenls (IT) Seller ^ B u y e r Buyer^and Seller confirm that prior to signing this 
Contract written disclosure of the agency relationshtp(s) was provided to him/her fa-W^V Buyers i n i t i a l s X ^ f i >" Seller s Initials <<K 
6 TITLE TO PROPERTY AND TITLE INSURANCE (a) Sellei has or shall have at Closirfe fee title to the Propertfanr/agrees to convey such title to Buyer by 
general warranty deed Wee of linancial encumbrances as warranted under Section 10 6 (b) Seller agrees to pay for and furnish Buyer at Closing with a 
current standaid lorm owner s policy of title insurance in the amount of the Total Purchase Price (c) the title policy shall conlorm with Sellei s obligations 
undei subsections (a) and (b) above Unless otherwise agiced under subsection 8 4 the commitment shall conform with the title insurance commitment 
provided under Section 7 
7 SELLER DISCLOSURES No late/ than 2 calendar days alter Acceptance Seller will deliver to Buyer the following Seller Disclosures (a) 
a Seller property condition disclosui e f or the Property signt-d and dated by Seller (b) a commitment for the policy of title insurance required under Section 
6 to be issued by the title insurance company chosen by Seller including copies ot all documents listed as Exceptions on the Commitment (c) a copy ol all 
loan documents relating to any loan now existing which will encumber the Property alter Closing and (d) a copy of all leases affecting the Property not 
expiring prior to Closing Seller agrees to pay any title commitment cancellation charge under subsection (b) 
8 GENERAL CONTINGENCIES In addition to Qualificalion under Section 2 2 this offer is (a) subject to Buyer s approval of the content of each of the items 
referenced in Section 7 above and (b) ^Q is D is not subject to Buyei s approval of an inspection of the Property The inspection shall be paid for by Buyer 
and shall be conducted by an individual/company of Buyer s choice Seller agrees to fully cooperate with such inspection and a walk through inspection 
under Section 11 and to make the Property available for the same 
B 1 Buyer shall h a v e ^ O calendar days alter Acceptance in which to review the content of Seller Disclosures and il the inspection contingency 
applies to complete and evaluate the inspection ol the Propeity and to determine if in Buyers sole discretion the content ol all Seller Disclosures 
(including the Property Inspection) is acceptable 
8 211 Buyer does not deliver a written objection to Seller regarding a Seller Disclosure or the Property Inspection within the time provided in subsection 8 1 
above that document or inspection will be deemed approved or waived by Buyer 
8 3 If Buyer objects Buyer and Seller shall have seven calendar days alter receipt of the objections to resolve Buyer s objections Seller may but shall not 
be required to resolve Buyer s objections II Buyer s objections are not resolved within the seven calendar days Buyer may void this Contract by providing 
written notice to Seller within the same seven calendar days The Brokerage upon receipt of a copy of Buyer s written notice shall return to Buyer the 
*- . » . _ rk 4 M
 n n h n r 0 n •"•^m£ln»ofam/iMr»i^rWr.nona l.thnn7atinnfmmSp|ler If this Contract is not voided by Buyer Buyers objection is 
9. SPECIAL CONTINGENCIES. This , 
The terms of attached Addendum ti _ 
ler is made subject to : . 
_are incorporated into this Contract by this relerence. 
10. SELLER'S LIMITED WARRANTIES. Seller's warranlies to Buyer regarding the condition of the Property are limited to the following: 
10.1 W/ien seller delivers possess/on ol the Property to Buyer, il will be broom-ciean and free of debris and personal belongings; 
10.2 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with the plumbing, plumbed fixtures, heating, cooling, ventilating, electrical and sprinkler 
systems, appliances and fireplaces in working order; 
10.3 Seller will deliver possession of the Properly to Buyer wild the roof and foundation free ol leaks known to Seller; 
10.4 Seller will deliver possession ol the Property to Buyer with any private well or septic tank serving the Property in working order and in compliance 
with governmental regulations; 
10.5 Seller will be responsible lor repairing any ol Seller's moving-related damage to the Property; 
10.6 At Closing, Seller will bring current all financial obligations encumbering the Property which are assumed in writing by Buyer and will discharge all 
such obligations which Buyer has not so assumed; and 
10.7 As of Closing, Seller has no knowledge ol any claim or notice of an environmental, building or zoning code violation regarding the Properly which 
has not been resolved. 
11. VERIFICATION OF WARRANTED AND INCLUDED ITEMS. Before Closing. Buyer may conduct a "walk-through" inspection of the Property to 
determine whether or not items warranted by Seller in Section 10.1,10.2,10.3 and 10.4 are in the warranted condition and to verily items included in Section 
1.1 are presently on the Property. II any item is not in the warranted condition. Seller will correct, repair or replace it as necessary or, with the consent ol 
Buyer, escrow an amount al Closing to provide lor such repair or replacement. The Buyer's failure to conduct a "walk-through" inspection, or to claim 
during the "walk-through" inspection that the Property does not include all items referenced in Section 1.1, or is not in the condition warranted in Section 
10. shall nol constilute a waiver by Buyer ol Buyer's rights under Section 1.1 or of the warranties contained in Section 10. 
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, no new leases entered into, and no substantial 
alterations or improvements to the Property shall be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer. 
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate or other entity, the person executing this Contract on its behalf 
warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller. 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This instrument together with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Selier Disclosures constitute the entire Contract 
between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or contracts between the 
parties. This Contract cannot be changed except by written agreement of the parties. 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parlies agree that any dispute or claim relating to this Contract, including but not limited to the disposition of the Earnest 
Money Deposit, the breach or termination ot this Contract, or the services relating to this transaction, shall first be submitted to mediation in accordance 
with the Utah Real Estate Buyer/Seller Mediation Rules ol the American Arbitration Association. Disputes shall include representations made by the 
parties, any Broker or other person or entity in connection with the sale, purchase, financing, condition or other aspect ot the Properly to which this Contract 
pertains, including without limitation, allegations ol conceaiinent, misrepresentation, negligence and/or Iraud. Each party agrees lo bear its own costs ol 
mediation. Any agreement signed by the parties pursuant to the mediation shall be binding. If mediation tails, the procedures applicable and remedies 
available under this Contract shall apply. Nothing in this Section 15 shall prohibit any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation. By 
marking this box D , and adding their initials, the Buyer ( ). and the Seller ( ), agree that mediation under this Section 15 is not mandatory, but is 
optional upon agreement ol all parlies. 
16-DJ=FAULT. II Buyer delaults. Seller may elect to either retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages or tn rptt irn thp Farnpsi Mnnpy Dffpnsil / 
and sue BuTeTTircrYfew^e-Sfilie^shghts. If Seller dejajilJs^a^dirroTTro return ol the EarnestMoney Deposit, Buyer may elect to either accept from Seller as * 
liquidated damages, a s n f n e n j j a p r u ^ nrtn*.ng Seller tor specific performance and/or damages. If Buyer elects to accept the « 
liquidateddaj]]ag^3rSEfle7l3grees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon demand WnVrp n SftRPTi i nf II lis Ponirftflt-proyHp? a sppp'fin r ^P^Y l n e 
parties"1ntend that the remedy shall be exclusive regardless ol rights which might otherwise be available under common lav/. 
17. ATTORNEY'S FEES. In any action arising out of this Contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 
1B. DISPOSITION OF EARNEST MONEY. The Earnest Money Deposit shall not be released unless il is authorized by: (a) Section 2, Section B.3 or Section 
15; (b) separate written agreement of the parties; or (c) court order. 
19. ABROGATION. Except lor express warranties made in this Contract, the provisions o( this Contract shall not apply alter Closing. 
20. RISK OF LOSS. All risk ol loss or damage to the Property shall be borne by Seller until Closing. 
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set lorth in this transaction. Extensions must be agreed to in writing by all parties. 
Performance under each Section ol this Contract which references a date shall be required absolutely by 5:00 PM Mountain Time on the stated date. 
22. FACSIMILE (FAX) DOCUMENTS. Facsimile transmission of any signed original document, and retransmission ol any signed facsimile transmission, 
shall be the same as delivery of an original. II the transaction involves multiple Buyers or Sellers, facsimile transmissions may be executed in counterparts. 
23. ACCEPTANCE. Acceptance occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an oiler or counteroffer ol the other: (a) signs the oiler or counter where noted 
to indicaye^cceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or the other parly's agent that the oiler or counteroffer has been signed as required. 
) TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. BuyeV oilers to purchase the Property on the above terms and conditions. If Seller does nol accept this offer by 
1 PM Mountain Time U | (lj> 19 _{-lp—. this offer shall lapse; and the Brokerage shall return the Earnest Money 
frfi -Ak, A 
(Oiler Date) (Buyer's Signature) 
The above date shall be the Ofier Relerence Date. 
(Offer Date) 
'Wft \^< Utft % m W \k<- ^Wirto 
(Notice Address) (Phone) (Notice Address) (Phone) 
ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTEROFFER 
CHECK ONE: 
D Acceptance of Ofier to Purchase: Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above. 
(Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) (Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
(Notice Address) 
D Rejection: Seller Rejects the foregoing offer.. 
(Notice Address) 
_ (Seller's initials) (Date). _ (Time) 
ISi Counter Oiler: Seller presents lor Buyer's Acceptance the terms of Buyer's offer subject to the exceptions or modifications as specified in the attached 
/Counter Otter # / 4 •••• jQ/J / ^ ^A*/*4, 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State Lav/ requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Contract bearing all signatures. (One of the following alternatives must therefore 
be completed). 
A. D I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the ioregoing Contract bearing all signatures: 
SIGNATURE OF SELLER SIGNATURE OF BUYER 
B. D I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Contract bearing all signatures to be mailed on . 
certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the D Seller D Buyer, Sent by 
Date 
. 1 9 - -by 
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ADDENDUM/COUNTER-OFFER 
NO._J 
TO < u t „ o u , 1 H o 
P F A i TD ft® S » » o • 7 u N n T 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
THIS IS AN Q ADDENDUM D COUNTER OFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with an Offer Reference 
Date of /3P£/L_ "Z-^ 19^ C , between ZJOtiA! Un/M£^ C.0tJ<T(^UCtfO^ , 
as Buyer, and Pir iT A/Ol/EV &Ot^ CP^lG /WQ TpA^ rsPgOCFft as Seller. 
The following tenns are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC, and to the extent that they modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, 
including all prior addenda and counter offers, these tenns shall control. All other tenns of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counter 
offers, not modified shall remain the same: 
f*-
(7-) 3 Cljl^lfiJG- SA/a/f Ocr<*i? / O X ; Q ^ / _ V ?Q [int^ //AJA.E^ THF B/J^F£ ///>?, 
boc^^r /076 A^bb&AUr^Cr^ Fc)£ <>(*£>/«'ttiD>J In rSn/i^iT C nu*ST y 
(H) <;MJ.£&< <,},.£ &££6lA£Sr- IF fyrffzZ P<LFAOLJ<> /', ^BC^muftC Of-TMT- Pg()F>EZJV 
A/j)^(F- fo;TH lrH£<£7i;lrAj OF AfJV A£riJiT£CriAfi«<- /)^/>^//J(rS THAT tJizCjf_. Ppqi/'££-£> 
/*7 T/V^ Poi/^T pF C&J76M-T. 
] SellLr^ 3 Buyer shall have until _ "" S" D A.M. ETP .M. Mountain Time , to accept the terms of this 
AD1JENDUM/C0UNTER OFFER in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of THE REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth 
in\his AD^E^DUM/COUNTER OFFER shall lapse. 
U Buyer O Seiter Signature Date Time D Buyer D Seller Signature Date Time 
ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTEROFFER 
CHECK ONE: 
D ACCEPTANCE of ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER: • Seller D Buyer hereby accepts the tenns of this ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER. 
D Buyer D Seller Signature Date Time D Buyer D Seller Signature Date Time 
o i 91 n 
NO. A 
* TO 
R£ALT0R
 REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
THIS IS AN Q ADDENDUMjfi COUNTER OFFER to that REAL ESTATE RURCHASE CONTRACT (Die "REPC") with an Of fer Reference 
Date of . , / ^ A ^ ' . ^ " ^ , • ' i 9 - ^ 2 , between ^ A /?/f /fc/vzz.^ C ^ Y ^ T4<O . - . / C ^ , 
as Buyer, and _/TV^E- HiruW OcTvi (Ztinsfr c^^cJ Tc^t $ ? ^ c ^ ^ as Seller 
Hie following \i-Tm^ a r e hcrcb) nfeorporated as pan of (he REPC, and to the extent thdt tliey modify or conflict wi th any provisions of the REPC, 
including all pnPr addenda and counter offers, these terms shall control All other tenns of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counter 
offers, not modfi£d 5^aJJ remain the same 
•{ The filers appreciate the Buyer's offer and accepts trie Purchase Contract from John Holmes 
Construct l n c - d a t e d A P n l 25> 1 9 9 6« except for the following revisions, all other terms reman* 
the same; 
2. Purchase Contract, paragraph 2: 
£a r nest Money Deposit shall be $1,000.00. 
Thera shall be an additional non-refundable deposit of $21,500.00 on or before May 24, 1996. 
Balance in cash at closing shall be $402,500.00 
3 The Earnest Money Deposit shall be immediately deposited upon acceptance, if for any reason 
the property is not acceptable to the Buyers on or before May 24,1996, the Broker is hereby 
directed to immediately refund the earnest money deposit to the Buyer without further written 
authorization from the Sellers and this contract shall become null and void upon such refund. 
4 Both the earnest money deposit and the additional non-refundable deposit totaling $22,500 00, 
5 h a i l become non-refundable after May 24, 1996, with rjo exceptions and shall be immediately 
released to the Sellers without prejudice or recourse from the Buyer. 
5 Paragraph 1 t 2 and 4 of Addendum Ho. 1 shall be aejetea. 
6 The due diligence period described in Paragraph 8.1 QI me r u . chase Contract shall be through 
May 24, 1996. 
7 P a r a p h 2.3 of the Purchase Contract is deleted in its entirety. 
8 p a r a p h ' s 10.1 through 10. 5 and 11 , of the Purchase Contract are not applicable to this 
con£ rac^ 
9 The Buyer acknowledges that the property will be conveyed "As Is". 
Page 1 o( 2 pages Seller's Initials ( P ^ T ) Date J ^ 2 £ £ Buyer's Initials ( ) Date 
o 
p i •** *s¥ 
10. The Buyers acknowledge and accept the current state of zoning on an "As Is" basis including 
the current state of compliance to Summit County zoning and development regulations and that 
the Consent Agreement by and between the Sellers, Craig, Hovey, and Spencer and Summit 
County dated June 12, 1995, concerning the property is not final and certain development 
requirements remain to be fulfilled. 
11. The Buyers acknowledge receipt of all Seller Disclosures pursuant to paragraph 7 of the 
Purchase Contract which includes a copy of said Consent Agreement, minutes]from Summit 
County records pertinent to said Consent Agreement, existing plans and maps land a 
preliminary title report; and that the Buyer acknowledges the Buyer has seen for it's self the 
condition of the property and accepts it "as is". 
12. The Buyer will obtain it's own survey. 
13. The Sellers will cooperate with the Buyers and provide all information in the possession of the 
Sellers to the Buyers but makes no warranty as to such information completeness or accuracy. 
14. The Buyer shall have until 5:00 pm, MDT, April 30, 1996, to accept the terms of this Addendum 
And Counter Offer in accordance to the provisions of Section 23 of the Purchase Contract. 
Unless so accepted this offer as set forth herein shall lapse and be null and void. 
y 
3'.3o Tt^ 
time 
time 
Seller signature, Thomas L. Spencer date / / time 
Please Check One 
ACCEPTANCE: The Buyers hereby accept the terms of this Addendum & Counter Offer. 
Buyer signature, date time 
Buyer signature, date time 
REJECTION: The Buyer rejects the foregoing Addendum & Counter Offer. 
Buyer signature, date time 
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ADDENDUM/eOUNTER-aFFKir 
NO._^Z__ 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT ° P P ° n T U M ' T Y 
THIS IS AN^DDEJ^UMD£OUNTJER OFFER to diat REAL ESTAT£ PURCHASE^ONTRACT (the "£EPC") with an Offer Reference 
Date of s^rPc/f ^ — ' . 19^6* . between v / c ^ O - V / / £ / ^ n i S ^ ^ 5 ^ ^ ^ -J-s^'C- .
 s 
as Buyer, and' ,/^TA.'/£. ^OiSt?y , J^h^r ^ ^ ^ V &^~c( "TBr^-^ 3 / P ^ r r g ^ " as Seller. 
The following tenns are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC, and to theextent that diey modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, 
including all prior addenda and countei offers, these tenns shall control. All other terms of die REPC, inci uding all-prior addenda and counter ! 
offers, not modified shall remain the same: 
/ • & ^2 i , -~ / f -
(7^ 77$ jPe^ ^e^ctryi J< rr>^- -ffftL ^^7tZ ^^^ce/^u^^r~
 s 
SAc. a Cox c/^/ -TO ZP^ 
MrryvP/d. 7p /?/&+*/c// a,t« 7/7/e C'cD. 6Qr7(\c7*\ ^7 p 4 / < cTF 
PC«y^
 /£&^-& <?r-<u&<yC & &-£ ~//lC /<7z T^CL. 7/uL. &• d'dft7tc^vr^-7~ 
4> ^(P&O ^ - r W W V 1 ^im-rtrc /$ -/c? &£. /^&/e&££c7 ~7<0 ~-^ruz_ ~ 
, . ^ / ^ W ~ ^ CL^xd C^CcC/7<fc/ ^ f C'tCSt^cz-
77 7 C^Cd^^n— 7777* c-Jj pth— pfa^e?r&*?A 
,€trcL ^ ^7 " Z2-
i-rrv err- i2e rtcrys* /7+<z^r7 -7(73, 7^9^ 77^/^u^ fyz&f 
CP/?7C'<T^7 a^\d ^<? //th^z ^<?/~<r_c 7o r<z7e&<;€ 7z? TSt^&v-
r?// &®^r/^ft>£>7 /&&/*/<?f Tip/Tib* 7e<7 a^^c//^ry- ^/cry?- p(97^<7^6<e 
E Seller D Buyer shall have until ^ " D A.M. T& P.M Mountain Time [ \ , 19J_£_, to accept the terms of this 
ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER in accordance widi the provisions of Section 23 of THE REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set fortli 
in'this ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER shall lapse. 
\ _ y r <^-)\w^ 7% iiv 
Ul Buyer D Seller Signature Date Time D BuyerlSfSeller Signature Date Time 
ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTER OFFER 
CHECK ONE: 
iACpCEPTANCE of ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER: D Sellei D Buyer hereby acce^hejerms-of-diis ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER. 
'_ 7^7y-^~~ w'l~?£ 
O Buyer ^ S e l l e r Signature Date Time D BuyerHi>eiler Signature Date Time 
D REJECTION: D Seller D Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER. 
(Initials) (Date) (Time). 
• COUNTER OFFER: D Seller D Buyer presents as a counter offer die terms set fortli on die attached Counter Offer # . 
ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER 
NO. 3 
TO 
PrAI TOP® 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
IBM THIS IS AN B ADDENDUM D COUNTER OFrER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (die "REPC") with an Offer Reference 
Date of / I P kit- ^ 6 , 19*1 L , ha ween ~~V)t-\N Hb^E^ tXJ^*51PunT lOO i rJC^ ,, 
as Buyer, and AlC C A/fy/fV ftflrJ C k/Vfr . A^L TH/n ^PZticS. fc. as Seller 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC, and to the extent that they modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, 
including all pnor addenda and counter offers, these terms shall control All other terms of uie REPC, including all prior addenda and counter 
offers, not modified shall remain the same 
(J) / 6 PE£ ^ECT/or^ J 6 QPTH£ A?£PC /)G£££^E/JT, T/V£ CODSfAJC i)A)T£ 
Q) ALL bl^E/l 7FP/*vS Of 7^E A<Z&F£mPK\T t^Ct-tibl/OG* ^ECRQN* * ? of 
sD Buyer shall have unt if ~> D A M D P M Mountain Time AUGUST ZO'. i9±L, to accept the terms of tins 
AD£fi^pcJM/COUNTER OFFER in accordance with the pros lsions of Section 23 of THE REPC Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth 
ifins A^DoWDUM/COUNTER OFFER shall lapse {*L^\^ ft \^A 
EZB uyeKJ SeV|er Signature Dale Time D Buyer D Seller Signature Date Time 
ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTEROFFER 
CHECK ONE: 
D AgCEPT^NCE ofAUDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER: D Seller D Buyer herebpeeep* the terms of this ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER 
D Buyer & Seiic^&gnature Dale Tune D Buyer £ t Seller Signature Date Time 
D REJECTION: D Seller D Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER 
(Initials) (Date) (Time). 
ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER 
NO._M 
REALTOR® TO
 EOU>lHOUS1HO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 0PPORTUH,T' 
THISISANrfADDENDUMDCOUNTEROFFERtoUmtREALESTATEPURCHASECONTRACTC^ 
D a l e
 of "rA,u - -*> 19 IL . between "Jo- ~ ,o , • >r ^  f
 0 ^ . ~ / v , • <• -r „ , , , „, <-
as Buyer, and I ic K IH-\ r , / „ , , . , f f , <-_ /,"M r - , /> - r r h >r ^ y ' " ~ ' 
_ — — —— — ^_^ __ as Seller. 
me following terms are liereby incorporated as part of the REPC, and to the extent that they modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC 
including ail prior addenda and counter offers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counter 
offeis, not modified shall remain the same: 
D Seller D Buyer shall have until • A.M. D P.M. Mountain Time __ 19
 l 0 accept the terms of this 
ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER in acco.dance with the provisions of Section 23 of THE REPC. Unless S c e n t e d , the offer as set forth 
, , / " ^ "Hhs ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER shall lapse. 
D Buyer^Sel ler Signature ~ ^ :Km7~ D Buyer ^ S e l l e r SignTture ^ T ~ K m 7 " 
ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTEROFFER 
CHECK ONE: 
D ACCEPTANCE of ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER: Q Seller D Buyer hereby accepts the terms of ihis ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER. 
D Buyer D Seller Signature Date Time D Buyer D Seller Signature 
D REJECTION: Q Seller D Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER. 
(Initials) (Date) (Time). 
Date Time 
- a oft„n«pr Mi^r th* t.rmc cpt fnrih nn ihp niinrhed Counter Offer # \j J. C w X 
